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Introduction

The American Civil War is almost never perceived or framed in an international
scope. The focus and study has been laser focused on the North American continent, the
United States, and mostly on the eastern theater of military operations. The western
theater is usually only mentioned with the lead up of General Ulysses S. Grant before he
takes command of the Army of the Potomac and the Union victories up and down the
Mississippi River. Politics is of course noted: the Republicans, with Abraham Lincoln,
win the election of 1860; the Southern Democrats leave the Union over fears of abolition
from the so-called Black Republicans. Economics has always been at the heart of Civil
War analysis as well. The issue of slavery is, at its very core, an economic concern.
Slaves were very hefty capital investments made by the Southern planter elite, the same
group of men who pushed the South into disunion. Slavery was also a fight over property
rights and the freedoms guaranteed to American citizens in the Constitution.
One large aspect of the war that is often unappreciated in the teachings and
perceptions of the American Civil War: diplomacy. It is diplomacy that almost expanded
the American Civil War into a global conflict. Diplomacy could have altered the course
of history and changed the face of the globe and all of human history with it. Diplomacy
was the key to the success of the Confederate States of America and yet, it is not given
more than a brief mention in passing in the classroom or in the minds of the public today.
The American Civil War is such a massive subject for historians to focus on and
study. Soon after the guns fell silent in May 1865, historians, veterans, and statesmen
alike started to write down the story of the American Civil War: why it happened, what
that experience was like, not only for them or their families or colleagues, but the entire
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nation as well, and what the consequences were of this terribly costly war. Despite this
massive and extensive library of historical knowledge and scholarly writing on the war
that is currently in existence, only a small sliver deals with diplomacy in any great detail.

Historiography

While Civil War diplomacy is underappreciated, there are some important works
that shed light on this complex and vitally important subject. One of the main themes that
historians tend to look at when researching and analyzing diplomacy during the Civil
War is Anglo-American relations. This is a very useful tool to describe why diplomacy
did or did not work in certain situations for the Confederacy. It is not however, Civil War
diplomacy. International relations play a very important role in the context and scope of
Civil War diplomacy. Numerous journal articles have been published citing the turbulent
Anglo-American relations between the Union and the English over the course of the Civil
War. The South failed to capitalize on the sour relations early in the war and so their
diplomacy failed, is the general argument presented in histories that over emphasize the
tumultuous relations between England and the Union. These studies tell a very important
part of the story but not the entirety of said story. "Power, Sovereignty, and the Great
Republic: Anglo-American Relations in the Ear of the Civil War" by Brian Reid is a
fantastic journal article that summarizes the Union view of the English and vice versa
during the conflict. Reid points to the balance of power and how the other side viewed
the other. The relations between the two nations was put to the test by the Civil War. 1
The article is well researched, but the focus and emphasis put on Anglo-American

1 Brain Reid, "Power, Sovereignty, a n d the Great Republic: Anglo-American Relations in the Ear of the Civil
War," Diplomacy & Statecraft 14, no. 2 (2003): 45-46.
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relations is far too great. That relationship needs to be put into a greater context of Civil
War diplomacy as a whole.
There are a few very important and influential historians writing in this field. One
of them is David Paul Crook. Two of his most famous and well-respected books are The
North, the South, and the Powers 1861-1865 and Diplomacy during the American Civil
War. 2 These two very well written narratives were both published in the mid- l 970s. Most

of the literature on Civil War diplomacy• was written from an older historical
perspective and is in need of updating and revising. Crook focuses his studies on the
Union, France, and England. Crook finds the most important themes and narratives of
Civil War diplomacy come from that older perspective. The political instability of Europe
during the decades leading up to the Civil War is the primary reason, according to Crook,
that the English and French did not join the Confederacy. Politics, and to a lesser extent
the economy, are at the forefront of his argument and research. The diplomats involved in
the negotiations take a back seat in his study. His study is narrowly focused on AngloAmerican relations during this period, and his research relies mainly on secondary
sources. This secondary research is not just regurgitated, however. Crook gives his own
personal take on the research that was available at the time of his writing. His argument
that the European climate was a major influence on the decisions by the English and
French governments not to intervene in the American Civil War is respected and valued
today. Crook does a great job of retelling well established themes and narratives such as
the Trent affair, the cotton famine, and French and English relations during the American
Civil War. Despite this, Crook fails to give proper acknowledgement to the other powers

2 David Paul Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers: 1861-1865 (New York: Wiley, 1974) and
David Paul Crook, Diplomacy during the American Civil War (New York: Wiley, 1975).
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in Europe at the time: Spain, Russia, Prussia, or Belgium. Crook downplays their role and
importance to the diplomatic efforts on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line. To Crook,
"Spain, Austria, and Russia merely flit across the stage." 3 This is plainly not so. True, the
major players in Union and Confederate diplomacy were both France and England.
However, both nations sent delegations to Belgium, Russia, Mexico, and other minor
nations to plead their case. These smaller diplomatic battles were very important to the
overall success or failure of Union and Confederate efforts.
Another important author in this area of history is Norman B. Ferris. His books,
The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis, and Desperate Diplomacy: William H Seward's
Foreign Policy,

1861,

are both very well researched and well written historical narratives

focusing mainly on the Union side of diplomacy. 4 Ferris' work on William Seward,
Lincoln's Secretary of State during the Civil War, attempts to put Seward in a better light
and clear up some misconceptions historians have had regarding his diplomatic efforts,
especially in the first year of the war. Ferris does not see some of Seward's actions, such
as threatening war with England over the recognition of the Confederate States of
America, as rash, impulsive, or dangerous, like many of his colleagues. Ferris relied on
archival material and manuscripts and not so much on being critical of other historians
works. 5 This served his work well. It was focused on interpreting the historical record
rather than going out of his way to criticize the other negative aspects of the Seward
historiography. Ferris only focuses on the Anglo-American relations before and during

3

vi.
Norman B. Ferris, The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis (Knoxvi l le, TN: University of Tennessee Press,
1997).
5 Norman Ferris, Desperate Diplomacy: William H. Seward's Foreign Policy, 1861 (Knoxville: University of
Ten nessee Press, 1976), viii.
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The North, the South, and the Powers,

6

the war in these books. He sees this relationship as the most important during the Civil
War. Diplomacy is more than just the relationship between two nations. Ferris fails to
expand on the relations the Union and Seward had with other European nations such as
France or Spain. He also fails to mention, in great detail, the Southern perspective, their
relationship with England, or a detailed view of Confederate-Anglo relations. These other
angles in international relations are vital to understanding the entire story of the failure of
Confederate diplomacy.
One of the larger, more well-known books on Civil War diplomacy is Blue

&

Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations written by

Howard Jones. 6 This has become the book at the forefront of scholarly work surrounding
Civil War diplomacy. Jones goes into great detail about both Union and Confederate
diplomatic efforts. He explores the lesser known aspects of this complex story, such as
neutrality rights, the 1 856 Declaration of Paris, and the British troops sent to Canada.
England and France are obviously at the center of his research. Jones notes the strain in
Anglo-American relations but does not dwell on this topic. He delves into economic and
political aspects of diplomacy as well. However, his work is not without fault. Little is
mentioned about public opinion in England or in America, North or South. Public
opinion played an important role in the outcome of the diplomatic operations of both the
Confederacy and the Union. Jones could have done more to explore how the public was
reacting to Union and Confederate diplomats and how their reaction altered the opinions
of those in government, especially the outspoken members of Parliament. Jones also
glosses over the Russian diplomatic initiatives. This needs more attention as well.

6

Howard J ones, Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations {Chapel
Hill, NC: University Of North Carol ina Press, 2010).
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Although Jones' book included both Union and Confederate efforts, his book focuses
heavily on the consideration of aid being provided to the South by the English. The book
lacked what the Union dealings were with the two great powers, France and England,
headed by Charles Adams. Overall, Howard Jones created a work that is well researched
and very well written that explores the complex world of international diplomacy during
the American Civil War.
To break from the Anglo-centric focus of many historians, Lynn Case and Warren
Spencer shift the study to France, the other Great Power in Europe. Case and Spencer see
the value and importance the French played in the struggle for Confederate recognition.
In their book, The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy, the two authors
describe the French position during the Civil War.7 However, the book does note the
early French leanings towards the Confederacy and some of their relations over the
course of the Civil War. This book also is told from a Eurocentric perspective rather than
an American one. It was very smart of Case and Spenser to do this. It changes the
existing historiography on Civil War diplomacy and acknowledges e¥eF view points and
perspectives other than that of the Americans, Union or Confederate. The study also taps
into the inner workings of the Franco-British diplomatic relationship during this time as
well. The book cites meeting after meeting between the two nations before discussing
policy matters with the Union. It shows their close working relationship during the
American Civil War. The book does retell old themes such as the cotton famine and the
decision by Napoleon Ill to hasten the French invasion of Mexico because of the collapse

7

Lynn M. Case a n d Warren F. Spencer, The United States and France: Civil War Diplomacy (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970).
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of the Confederacy. But, the book overall stands the test of time. Despite being published
in 1970, Case and Spenser have created a study that is both informative and noteworthy.
These historical works are very important to the complete story of the American
Civil War. It was not just about battles, politics, or slavery. This historiography illustrates
that there was another war going on behind the scenes that should be brought to the
forefront of discussion. Yes, Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant were fighting it out on
the battlefield to determine the future of the American Union. However, both North and
South were fighting on another front, the diplomatic front with words and pens instead of
minie balls, cannons, and bayonet charges. Diplomats were working tirelessly throughout
the war to help their side win. The South scrambled to find European nations to recognize
them as an independent nation and help with their war effort against the might of the
Union armies. The Union on the other hand fought to maintain the status quo. The
current, outdated literature puts too much focus on the cotton famine and Anglo
American relations as an explanation as to why the European powers never recognized
the Confederacy. Diplomacy is about the personality of the diplomats themselves, not just
economics or the like. What the other historians have failed to analyze in great detail or
make the central focus of Civil War diplomacy are the diplomats themselves. Those men
are responsible for the success or failure in how the European powers viewed the
Confederate States of America. It is important to look at who Jefferson Davis appointed
as he was establishing the Confederate government and why these individuals received
their appointments. It is also important to look at the diplomats' backgrounds and
personal viewpoints to understand why they made the choices they made while over in
Europe.

9

Another aspect of the historiography that requires revision is that the focus is
limited to England and France primarily. While it is true that both England and France
played the biggest roles in both Union and Confederate diplomacy, they were not the
only nations to receive diplomatic attention. Spain, Russia, Belgium, Prussia, the Vatican,
Mexico, and even the Native American tribes were reached out to by either the Union,
Confederacy, or both. Diplomatic effort during the American Civil War was not just
focused in Europe on the Great Powers, as most historians make it out to be. The
Confederates put the majority of their effort and faith in both England and France, but
they were not the only road to recognition. The other powers in Europe and the Americas
are worth exploring. A comprehensive account of diplomacy during the Civil War, and
explanation for why the Confederacy failed to gain recognition, includes looking at these
lesser discussed or forgotten nations.
This thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter One will unpack the policy makers in
the Confederate State Department. Because diplomacy, at its most basic, is the interaction
between people to push an agenda, the diplomats, heads of state, and members of
Congress/Parliament should be focused on, specifically their background and their beliefs
on foreign relations. By breaking that open and analyzing those beliefs and personalities
it will be easier to piece together their decision making during the war. Actions
performed by the state are ultimately the result of the leaders of that state. That is the
main point that current Civil War diplomacy is lacking. While it is important to study the
larger political and economic context, which most historians in this area of study have
done a very thorough job, those two central themes contain human elements that are often
overlooked.
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The second chapter will focus on the Confederate diplomatic efforts in Mexico
and with the Native American tribes in early 1861. These were the first instances where
the Confederacy reached out to other foreign powers after secession. The main targets of
the Davis administration were England and France, the two major powers in Europe at
the time. However, Davis and his state department had the brains to send commissioners
to the Native Americans to secure treaties ranging from trade agreements to alliances.
This was an important milestone in the history of the international relations of the
Confederacy. Their early successes with the Indians gave added hope and confidence to
the Davis administration of their chances to negotiate with the European powers. The
Mexican expedition is also important to study because it is the first time where both the
Union and Confederate diplomats clash to influence the leader of a foreign nation. This
interaction will be repeated in royal courts across Europe during the duration of the war.
Chapter Three will shift the focus to the European theater of diplomatic battle,
focusing on France and the lesser powers of Europe. These lesser nations played a role in
the diplomacy of both the North and the South. The Russians, Belgians, Spanish, and
even the Vatican were all targets of diplomatic interactions during the war. Obviously,
the French and the English were the main targets, but effort and time were sunk into these
smaller nations of Europe for a reason. The Confederacy was casting a wide net at the
outbreak of hostilities. They were looking for friends wherever they could find them. The
Spanish, French, Dutch, and English all had ports in the Caribbean and Davis wanted
access to them to make running the ever-tightening Union blockade that much easier.
These less powerful nations on the European continent could, without a doubt, be very
useful in the eyes of the Confederacy. That is why it is very important not to overlook the
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efforts by the Confederacy to persuade them to j oin their war efforts and recognize them
as a legitimate nation. The French also played a major role in the mission to Mexico
made by the Confederates as well. Napoleon III had hopes of restoring the French Empire
to its former glory and Mexico was one of his targets. The Confederacy could take
advantage of that opportunity.
Chapter Four will focus on the main player, England. They were the top power in
Europe at the time. The Confederate hope, early on, was that when England recognized
them as a sovereign nation, the rest of Europe would quickly follow, and the Union
would have no choice but to concede. Obviously, that did not occur. It is not debated that
the Confederacy needed England to sign off on their independence for it to become
legitimate. A nation is only a nation once it has been formally recognized by the major
international powers; the Confederacy knew this and made a great effort to bring England
to their side. Trade and cotton, as mentioned previously, are the main concerns many
historians point to as the leading reasons that the English government failed to recognize
the Confederacy. However, this chapter will examine the international maritime laws that
focus on privateering and the rights of neutral shipping and the legality of a blockade
being established. The English were the ones to push for these international laws to be
passed after the Crimean War. They were near and dear to the hearts of the English
Parliament and other government officials in England. Both the issue of trade and cotton
supplies rest upon this larger issue of maritime law and the enforcement of those laws
established by the international community in Europe. The Confederacy did not sign onto
these naval laws and this hurt their credibility with some in the English government. The
Confederacy had no navy to speak of at the outbreak of the war and needed these
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privateers to supply the South and fend off the Union blockade. They were unwilling to
change this tactic for the English. However, the Union blockade was questioned as well
as their attacks on English shipping. These breaches in maritime law sparked heated
debated in the House of Lords and were a big concern to all of Parliament. This focus on
maritime law and the realization that England is a maritime superpower at this time is
often absent in the historiography Civil War diplomacy.
This thesis will explain why the South failed to gain European recognition along
with the Union efforts to combat those diplomats loyal to Jefferson Davis and the
Confederacy. The emphasis will focus on the diplomats themselves. They are the most
important factor in diplomacy, but they are the least examined part of Civil War
diplomacy. It is very important to dissect these individuals and determine who they were,
how they acted, and what they thought in order to fully understand the Confederate
diplomatic failure. Also, this thesis will explore the other nations that scholars have left
out of their works. These nations also participated in the diplomatic actions and
negotiations. It is not the intention of this thesis to change the historiography of Civil War
diplomacy because there are very important and well researched books already in place.
Rather, I seek to add on to the existing work and offer an updated analysis of the sources
available to scholars. Diplomacy is a very broad topic packed full of information and
confusion, and Civil War diplomacy is in need of an update.
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Chapter One:
The Confederate Secretaries of State: The Revolving Door of Richmond

In modem conception, the term "foreign relations" conjures up images of
embassy buildings surrounded by guards, the United Nations members in the grand hall
with placards of their nation alongside a small flag of their nation, or, in the case of the
United States, images of the State Department in downtown Washington D.C. However,
the common thread that binds all of these ideas together and connects them are the
individuals who actually conduct the diplomacy. During the American Civil War, the
diplomacy was conducted via personal meetings and letters of correspondence. Even with
the invention of the internet, telephones, email, and social media, the nations of modem
day still send out actual people to represent their government to a foreign nation. The
importance of the individual diplomat is often overshadowed or lost in the larger idea of
foreign relations or power politics. During the Civil War, the lack of those modem
inventions of communication and convenience put all the more importance and pressure
on the individual diplomat. Since diplomacy is conducted on the individual level, not at
the state level, it was vital that the diplomats assigned to conduct diplomacy for both the
Union and Confederacy had a good notion of the field, were determined, and could carry
out the assignments handed down from their superiors. Both Lincoln and Davis placed
massive trust on the men they sent overseas to conduct diplomacy for their respective
nations.
When the Confederate States of America declared its independence in 1 86 1 , it
had to build a nation and a government from the ground up. The representatives who
attended the secession debates in their states and decided to resign their seats in the
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House and the Senate, their commission in the Army or Navy, or resign from the
multitude of federal positions in Washington D.C. did so knowing the risks involved and
the work that needed to be done to secure their independence and build a nation based on
their own ideals. These men who would form the inner circle of the Confederate
government came from all across the Confederacy. Each man brought his own set of
skills, his own ideas and values that, in his mind, best represented this new Confederacy.
The United States was built on the principle that everyone is entitled to have and to share
their opinion. That is a wonderful protection this country has. However, when forming a
nation out of nothing, like the Founding Fathers did back in the 1780s, differing ideas can
cause conflict and friction that tests the infant nation's limits. The Founding Fathers had
time to have open debates and discussions about what the new United States government
would like look and how it would function. The delegates for the Confederacy did not
have the luxury of time on their side.
The man elected to lead this new nation was Jefferson Davis. His career in
politics began when Davis was campaigning for then presidential nominee James K.
Polk. Davis and his family had always been strong supporters of Thomas Jefferson,
Andrew Jackson, and the Democratic Party. 8 During this campaigning for Polk, Davis
would realize his natural talent as a public speaker and his love for politics. The work he
did for Polk also introduced this reclusive planter to the people and voters of the state of
Mississippi. Due to this new-found popularity, Davis was nominated in 1845 by the
Warren County Democratic Convention as its candidate for representative in Congress. 9
During his time in Congress, Davis would speak out for his home state of Mississippi and

8
9

Clement Eaton, Jefferson Davis ( New York: Free Press, 1977), 47.
Ibid, 50.
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its voters. He was a very engaged and active member of the House of Representatives.
While Davis was a Democrat, he broke from the party on numerous occasions. John
Calhoun introduced a harbor and rivers improvement bill, and he wanted the Mississippi
and its tributary rivers to be categorized as an inland sea and thus able to be selected for
congressional money for improvements. 10 Davis was appalled at such a bill because it
violated his strict interpretation of the Constitution. He stuck with the more traditional
Democratic approach to leave internal improvements to the states. 1 1 Another notable
break from the party was during his times in the House. In 1 846, Davis delivered a
speech before the House on the Oregon question. The Democratic Party was in favor of
repealing the treaties signed with England regarding how to and where to split the Oregon
Territory. The Democrats wanted to push the boundary all the way to the Russian boarder
of 54 degrees. 12 Davis agreed that acquiring both California and the Oregon Territory was
in the best interest of the United States but was not in the extremist camp of "54° 40' or
Fight." He did not think risking war with England over Oregon was necessary. 13 His time
in the House of Representatives would help shape Davis' political views as well as
introduce him not only to fellow representatives but also to the nation and politics.
The Mexican-American War changed Davis. He would go from slow expansionist
by Southern Democrat standards to a radical, pro Southern expansionist. During his time
serving as the Secretary of War in Pierce's cabinet, Davis took the lead on a plan to
annex all of Cuba and carve three states out of the Spanish colony. The island, of course,
would have to be flooded with new slaves and that meant reopening the African slave

10
11
12
13

Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,
Ibid,

54.
54 .

54.
54.
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trade. 14 This outspoken attitude towards Southern expansion also gained Davis notable
attention. He took his Southern nationalism to the Nashville Convention in 1 850; Davis
was one of its most passionate promoters. 1 5 His fiery rhetoric on secession would die
down after the convention and his loss of the governor' s office in his home state of
Mississippi to Henry Foote.1 6 Despite this, sectional tension was heating up and the
nation was hurtling towards a civil war.
Unlike most of his fellow Southerners in Congress, Davis waited until he received
official notice that his home state of Mississippi had in fact seceded from the Union. On
January 2 1 , 1 86 1 , Jefferson Davis would give his farewell address to the Senate and
resign his post. His speech was well spoken and dignified. Davis doubled down on his
commitment to secession during this speech. Mississippi has a "justifiable cause, and I
approve of her act."1 7 By leaving the Union, Mississippi would "surrender all the
benefits, deprive herself of all the advantages, sever all ties of affection which have
bound her to the Union." However, by giving up these numerous benefits, Mississippi
was "exempt from any power to execute the laws of the United States within her
limits."18 To Davis, secession was legitimate and within any state's authority. His parting
words to his fellow Congressmen was that of peace and stability going forward. Davis
urged "peaceful relations with [the North], though we must part. They may be mutually
beneficial to us in the future, as they have been in the past, if you so will it." 19 Davis
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Burton J. Hendrick, Statesmen of the Lost Cause: Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet (New York: Literacy
Guild of America, 1939), 47.
15 Ibid, 49.
16
Ibid, 50.
17
Farewell Add ress, January 21, 1861, in Papers of Jefferson Davis 1861, vol . VII, eds., Lynda Lasswell Crist
and Mary Seaton Dix ( Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 19.
18
Ibid, 20.
1 9 Ibid, 22.
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peremptorily blamed the Union if hostilities were to break out between the North and the
South. The North would be the aggressors in this conflict, according to Davis and most, if
not all, of his cabinet members.
Davis was unanimously elected President of the Confederate States of America,
and he was inaugurated on February 1 8, 1 86 1 . The Montgomery convention decided to
elect Davis for president for both practical and political reasons. Both Robert Toombs
and Howell Cobb of Georgia were in the running but were passed over because the state
of Georgia's votes were se split between Toombs, Cobb, and Alexander Stephens, who
ended up gathering enough support to become the vice president of the Confederate
States of America. Robert Rhett and William Yancey were also passed over because their
views on secession were too extreme and the Confederacy was still trying to add more
states at this time. 20 The Southern press hailed Jefferson as the right man for the job. The
Charleston Mercury wrote a lengthy article detailing Davis' past accomplishments on the

battlefield and in the Senate before announcing his resignation "in a brief address of
characteristic loftiness of tone, manliness of sentiment and
decision of utterance."21 The press painted Davis as a man who stood up for what is right
and the only man who could lead the Southern Confederacy to victory over the Union.
The Charleston Mercury promoted Davis in this exact light:

Let it suffice that, judging him by his whole public career, no man, unless
Calhoun or Quitman were living, could well dispute with him the highest place in
Southern confidence; and that certainly none, dead or living, among Southern
statesmen, could be named, who, on the score of administrative ability, are
equally adapted with him to fill the high and responsible position to which he has
been called, in an emergency which imperiously demands that the right men shall
be in the right places. 22
20 Jefferson Davis,

125.
"Jefferson Davis." The Charleston Mercury, February 23, 1861.
22
Ibid.

21
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Davis was a champion of states' rights and Southern imperialism in the decade
following the Mexican-American War. It would be this drive and determination that
would propel him to the presidency. However, Davis would have rather commanded
troops on the battlefield than organize a government. This mix of reluctance and Southern
pride defined him for the rest of his life. His government would be filled with both
friends and foes of Davis, but they would have to work together to get the Confederate
States of America off the ground and running.
The most important position in the Confederate Cabinet for obtaining
international recognition from the powers of Europe was the Secretary of State. This
prominent position would be filled four times over the duration of the war. However,
Davis originally selected Robert Toombs for the job. Toombs, born in 1 8 1 0 and the son
of a Revolutionary War veteran, found himself in Congress in 1 844 representing the
citizens of Georgia. 23 He was a member of the Whig Party and a legend in Washington.
Charming, charismatic, and appealing to the average citizen, Toombs had a reputation for
being an expert in giving speeches and winning debates. This legacy and reputation
followed him to Washington. A staunch Whig, Toombs favored a moderate protective
tariff. He even enjoyed singling out his fellow Southerners, Whig or Democrat, who put
their own interests ahead of the Union or their state. Although Toombs was a defender of
slavery, he broke with is fellow Southerners to oppose President Polk and his Mexican
War. He knew and predicted that once the United States had won the Mexican War, it
would lead to "the acquisition of Mexican territory and that would precipitate a disastrous

23

Statesmen of the Lost Cause,

71.
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argument on slavery."24 He defended slavery and the rights of the South, but he saw the
need to protect the Union more. After the Mexican American War, Toombs accepted the
territorial gains of the United States and the fulfillment of Manifest Destiny and became
an unyielding champion of the rights of the South in the newly acquired territory. 2 5
Toombs' s emergence as a champion of the South's right in this new territory did
not automatically align him with Davis and the radical states' rights advocates. Davis and
Toombs disagreed on many issues that led up the Civil War. Toombs supported the
Compromise of 1 850, California entering the Union as a free state, popular sovereignty in
the New Mexico Territory, and the banning of the slave trade in the District of
Columbia.26 Jefferson Davis opposed all of these measures that Toombs worked so hard
to defend. Toombs also opposed John Calhoun's creation of a sectional Southern party in
1 849 because, in Toombs' view, any party that was not continental in sweep was not a
true party of the American republic. 2 7

In the

years leading up to the Civil War, Toombs

referred to any man who was undermining the existing national system in America as
"bad men and traitors."2 8 This strong, genuine sense of unionism dominated Toombs'
political thinking and career during the 1 840s and 1 850s. However, as the nation became
more divided on slavery, Toombs and other Southern defenders of unionism began to
change their minds.
The nation was a very different place in 1 860 than ten years earlier following the
victory over the Mexican forces. The rise of the Republican Party and its growing calls
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Ibid,
26 Ibid,
27 Ibid,
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for the destruction of slavery, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise, the Dred Scott ruling, John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry, and the final
blow of Lincoln's election in 1 860 all contributed to the drastic change that occurred in
the United States in the ten years before the war. All of these factors also changed Robert
Toombs' views on unionism and Southern rights as well.
Toombs left the Senate in January 1 86 1 after delivering a heated speech in which
he branded Abraham Lincoln "an enemy of the human race and deserves execration of all
mankind."29 Toombs became one of the most outspoken members of secession by the
winter of 1 860 into 1 86 1 . He reversed his defense of the Constitution and argued that the
South was better off without it. His final statement in the United States Senate called for
war against the Union and declared that his home state of Georgia is ''on a war path," and
that Georgia and the South are "ready to fight now as we have ever shall be!" 30 He then
stormed out of the chamber, went to the Treasury Department and demanded his salary
and mileage compensation and took it all back to Georgia. Soon after his explosive
resignation, later that month in fact, Georgia left the Union on January 1 9, 1 86 1 with
Toombs leading the call for secession in Georgia. This outspoken loyalty to the secession
movement and to his home state along with his reputation and statesman-like quality led
Davis to appoint Toombs to be his Secretary of State after his election.
Toombs was not the only Confederate secretary of state during the Civil War. He
resigned on July 24, 1 86 1 in a letter to Jefferson Davis. Toombs left the Davis Cabinet
because "duty calls me to the battlefield." He and Davis, Toombs insisted, "never had a
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single difference of opinion in any degree affecting the public interest." 3 1 Despite his
early departure from the Davis administration, Toombs set the course for Confederate
foreign policy and took the early steps to gain European recognition. He got to work right
away after his appointment. It would be his job to forge friendly relationships with the
European Powers, primarily France and England, in the hopes of guaranteeing European
recognition of the Confederate States of America.
When Toombs left government work for the glory of the battlefield, Robert
Hunter was appointed the new Confederate Secretary of State. The news of Toombs '
resignation did not make headlines in either the South or the North; the battles were still
stealing the front pages. A few brief mentions of the change up in the cabinet was all the
press coverage given to this massive change in Confederate diplomacy. A newspaper in
Warrenton, Virginia, however, was elated to see a Virginian in one of the most powerful
positions in the Confederate government. They praised Hunter, "who has long been
conspicuous for his profound statesmanship, philosophic temperament and varied
learning, will conduct the diplomatic affairs of the Government with the same masterly
ability which has illustrated his official acts during the long period of his public career." 32
There had been a demand for restructuring the cabinet since the Montgomery
Convention. Several new states were now added to the Confederacy, and the most
important among them was Virginia. It would be the state where the Confederate
government would be located, and the state, with all its wealth and grandeur, needed to
be represented in the cabinet as soon as possible. That made the choice easy for Davis

31

Tombs to Davis, J u ly 24, 1861, in Papers of Jefferson Davis 1861, vol. VII, eds., Lynda Lasswel l Crist and
Mary Seaton Dix, ( Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Un iversity Press, 1992), 266.
32 "Cabinet Changes," Warrenton Flag of'98, August 1, 1861.

22

when he selected Hunter to replace Toombs. 33 His selection was widely popular and
accepted across the South.
Hunter was indeed a man with a long and vocal history of public service. He was
born in 1 809 in Virginia, a state which he served his entire life and eventually swear
allegiance to when Virginia voted to leave the Union. He began his political life at age
twenty-six when he was elected to the Virginia House of Representatives. From there,
Hunter served in the House of Representatives in 1 83 7 and as Speaker in 1 839. 34 He rose
with speed and distinction in the public light. In 1 84 7, Hunter served as a Senator from
Virginia until his resignation in 1 86 1 after the secession of his home state. He was not an
avid secessionist like Davis. Hunter was in favor of a peaceful resolution between the
North and South. Rather than secession, Hunter pushed for a Southern convention to
establish new constitutional amendments to guarantee Southern rights and security over
their property. 3 5 But, despite this desire to keep the Union as a whole, Hunter was
selected as part of the Virginia delegation sent to Montgomery when Virginia seceded.
For Hunter, as for so many in the Confederacy, state loyalty trumped loyalty to one's
nation.
Hunter would not drastically alter the course of Confederate direction to the
diplomats already stationed overseas put into place by Toombs. His focus still centered
on bringing England and France in on the side of the Confederacy. However, as time
passed, and little progress was made by the commissioners, it became clear to Hunter that
a swift recognition of the Confederacy by the major powers in Europe was slipping
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through his fingers. Hunter, despite serving as the secretary of state for a very short time,
still managed to set up connections with Spain, and he started to focus on bringing
England into the conflict based on Union maritime policy and the blockade on Southern
ports. Hunter's desire to leave his position would be the same as his predecessor; the job
was not meaningful or exciting in his mind. 36 Hunter rose to fame and political
importance in the United States Senate, and he missed the excitement of politics in that
chamber. Hunter resigned in February 1 862 and joined the Confederate Senate. Neither
Toombs nor Hunter could see the importance of their position in the Confederate
government. The Southern drive for glory and honor blinded both men. The honor and
prestige that is associated with the military, especially in Southern culture, as well as the
more active and hands-on political atmosphere of the Senate was too much of a
temptation. Davis needed a secretary of state who was confident in their ability,
knowledgeable, and well rounded. Someone who Davis could trust and rely on. He found
all of those qualities in Judah Benjamin.
Judah Benjamin was born in St. Croix on August 1 1 , 1 8 1 1 . His family emigrated
to the United States, and Benjamin ended up in Louisiana after college at Yale. His
political career began in 1 842 in the lower house of the Louisiana State Assembly as a
Whig. 37 However, his real passion was practicing law. This was his occupation prior to
jumping into politics. He made his money at his law office and his sugar plantation, the
Bellechasse. 3 8 Benjamin was elected to the state senate, where he worked alongside John
Slidell, in 1 85 3 , and would serve in that office until secession. He began to see the fading
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popularity and strength of the Whig Party, and in 1 856, he formally made the switch to
the Democratic Party. 3 9 This relatively recent switch to the Democratic Party, in the
context of the secession movement, made Benjamin a late-comer to secession politics. He
avidly defended Southern honor and rights and was in favor of the move to withdraw his
state of Louisiana from the Union. Once Louisiana seceded, Benjamin retired to his law
practice until Davis nominated him for the position of attorney general. 40
In the realm of Confederate politics, no man was as qualified as Judah P.
Benjamin. He became known as the "brains of the Confederacy" due to his skill and
abilities working within the Davis administration. Benjamin would have to pick up the
pieces of Confederate foreign policy where Hunter had left them. He was not new to the
Davis administration or even the Davis cabinet. He began his Confederate political career
as the first attorney general, appointed on February 25, 1 86 1 . 4 1

In

September 1 86 1 , after

the resignation of LeRoy Walker, Benjamin was appointed to the position of secretary of
war. He served in that post until the resignation of Hunter in 1 862.
As secretary of state, Benjamin was fighting an uphill battle. The expectations
that France and England would quickly recognize the Confederacy were fading rapidly,
and the new secretary of state could see it as well. When he first took office, Benjamin
did not want to alter from the course set by his predecessor. His main reason for this was
not his love for the policies, but rather the difficulty the Confederates were having in
communicating with the commissioners in Europe. Benjamin feared making drastic
policy changes due to this difficulty. 42 This was a major setback for the South because
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their current strategy of King Cotton Diplomacy and asserting their Southern right to
secession was not winning over the hearts and minds of either the French or the British.
Eventually Benjamin changed the tactic of his commissioners. His new focus, using his
background in law, focused on the illegality of the Union blockade against the South and
that recognition by England and France would bring peace, not further war with the
Union. 43 Benjamin charted a new course for foreign relations in the Confederate States of
America. A much-needed revitalization of policy and instruction would be handed down
from Benj amin. However, the slow and spotty communication between himself and his
commissioners along with the Southern belief that the cotton trade was their saving grace
thwarted the plans of Benjamin.
Benjamin was a prime example of how much of a revolving door the Davis
cabinet really was. The secretary of state, one of the key offices in the Confederacy to
securing Southern independence, could not operate effectively because of the seemingly
constant changes at its head. Over the course of two years, the secretary of state position
saw three chiefs. Each new incoming director tried their best to pick up where the
previous director had left off. It was incredibly inefficient and disastrous for the overall
Confederate foreign policy. In the age of letters and slow communication between the
North America and Europe, this continual change of leadership in the state department
made it near impossible to have effective and clear directions for the Confederate agents
on the ground. They were left to do the brunt of the work without their boss back in
Richmond. Yes, each secretary of state contacted Confederate commissioners overseas.
However, it was vital to the success of the Confederacy to secure an alliance with the
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major powers in Europe and the revolving door in and out of the state department made
that already monumental task that much more complicated.
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Chapter Two:
Negotiations in North America: Setting the Stage for Europe

The Confederacy needed a quick war to defeat the Union, and European
recognition was the way to guarantee that victory. European recognition, Confederates
hoped, would help them break the Union blockade that was starving and strangling the
Confederacy, put pressure on the Union from multiple fronts, and allow the Davis
administration some leverage over the Union at the negotiating table. Davis and the
Confederate cabinet members thought recognition would be easy. The South had massive
economic ties with England and France and cordial relations with Mexico. Davis and his
diplomats understood the importance of their foreign relations missions to the Great
Powers of Europe. Their survival depended on it. Despite the grave importance of their
mission, however, the Davis cabinet and the diplomats sent to Mexico were over
confident and did not care to understand the Mexicans. This spelled the end for the
mission before it ever began. Union diplomats were determined to keep Mexico out of
the hands of the Confederacy, and they had the patience, time, and money to do so.
Davis and Toombs sent the first Confederate foreign diplomatic mission, not to
Europe, but to Mexico. The odds looked good in early 1 86 1 for a Confederate diplomatic
victory in Mexico. Davis, at the request of John Forsyth, the American minister to
Mexico in the years leading up to the Civil War, appointed John Pickett as a special agent
to represent the Confederate government in Mexico. According to the letter that
accompanied that request, Forsyth boasted that Pickett was "admirably qualified for such
a mission." Forsyth also noted that Pickett's "knowledge of Mexican character, its
language and its public men, his well-known Southern loyalty and personal chivalry
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recommended him as eminently suitable to fill a position so delicate and important as
this."44 A graduate of West Point, Pickett resigned his army post for an exciting life as a
diplomat.
On May 1 7, 1 86 1 , Pickett received a letter that contained his formal post as the
Confederate commissioner to Mexico and his diplomatic instructions from Toombs.
Pickett was to "assure them [Mexico] of the readiness of this Government to conclude a
treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with that Republic on terms equally
advantageous to both countries."45 The Confederacy hoped that their diplomats could
sway the Mexican government from the influence of the Union and open up trade
relations with the South. Toombs was a smart diplomat when it came to the instructions
for Pickett.

In

his letter informing Pickett of his new role as Confederate commissioner to

Mexico, Toombs went into extensive detail on why the Mexican government should align
with the South. Pickett was instructed to emphasize and note that both Mexico and the
Confederates are "principally engaged in agriculture and mining pursuits, and their
interests are therefore homogeneous."46 Toombs evoked a communal sense of agriculture
as leverage over the Union's increased use of railroads and very early stages of
industrialization. The Confederacy could also protect Mexico from foreign invasion with
an alliance, and it "is obvious that they [the Confederacy] could do so more promptly and
effectively than any more distant nation."47 With this bond established, Toombs
instructed Pickett to convince the Mexican government to put its faith in the Confederate
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army and strategy for winning the war. This was a tall order for Pickett since the
Confederate army had yet to prove itself in battle at the time Toombs penned the
instructions to Pickett; it would be another two months until the battle of First Bull Run,
the first major conflict of the war.
The unstable and poor nation of Mexico hardly appeared a likely candidate for a
Confederate diplomatic mission for recognition. Mexico's instability played into the
hands of the Confederates because "no country enjoyed less respect or influence in the
foreign offices of the world, and none seemed less likely to be flattered by a proud young
people, like the Confederacy, seeking international standing."48 Pickett and Toombs tried
to strike a chord with the Mexican government by relating the Confederate struggles with
the Union to the Mexican quarrels with the Spanish. Pickett was the man responsible for
opening the door with Mexico then, in tum, opening a door with the European powers.
The planned diplomatic attack was not a frontal assault on Paris or London, but a
backdoor approach through Mexico City. 49
The European powers retained a vested interest in Mexico ever since the Spanish
left in 1821. Mexico was the jewel of Central America and its resources highly desired by
the English and the French, primarily. The Mexican government, constantly in turmoil
and upheaval, was in massive debt to the European powers. The powers of Europe
wanted their cash back from Mexico and decided that they knew how to run the country
better than the Mexicans did. After all, since the departure of the Spanish in 182 1 , the
Mexican government went through seventy-five presidents.5 0 The Mexican government
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showed no signs of stabilizing either. The most formidable opponent to the European
plans for Mexico was the United States. Americans had already shown their desire for
land in the New World. Their massive land grab in the Mexican-American War
reaffirmed the European belief that America was a growing economic threat. The Monroe
Doctrine was another obstacle to the European plans for Mexico. Many European leaders
and governments had dismissed the Doctrine when it was first announced in 1 823 .
However, as the United States continued to expand west to the Pacific Ocean and grow
its economy, Europeans took the Doctrine more seriously. It was not stopping any
European power, but it was certainly something to consider. The New York Herald called
the European plans for Mexico "direct infringement of the Monroe doctrine, threatening
the very existence of a sister republican constitution, and likely to vitally affect the
integrity of the republican form of govemment."5 1 Because the Americans were engulfed
in a Civil War, the European plans for Mexico were back on the table. Americans, too
occupied with their blockade of the East Coast, would not be focused on European fleets
entering and leaving the Gulf of Mexico. Of the European powers, the French, under
Napoleon III, had the greatest hopes and plans for Mexico. France had seen the turbulent
Mexican governments fail time and time again. To restore glory to France and rebuild the
French Empire, Napoleon III and his noble Spanish wife Eugenie, drafted up plans of an
invasion of Mexico that placed Archduke Maximilian of Hapsburg, second in line for the
Austro-Hungarian throne, on the throne in Mexico to establish a stable, European
government in Mexico.52 With a weakened, distracted U.S. government, the French
realized their opportunity to pursue their plan. In the view of the Europeans, secession
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turned the Monroe Doctrine back into a laughable document. A divided America could
not stand up to the massive European fleets or armies looking to encroach into Central
and South America.
The Confederacy saw the opportunity to capitalize on diplomacy during this time
as well. The necessities of war and conflict brought the Confederates and French very
close. In 1 86 1 any enemy of the U.S. federal government, wherever they were found,
were destined to become friends with the Confederacy. Davis and Toombs had something
concrete to offer Napoleon III, and the French had much to offer the Confederacy in
return. If the Confederate States of America could get the French to recognize their
independence, England was sure to follow because France and Great Britain acted as a
single unit in the American crisis. They both sent a joint delegation to Washington after
both nations declared the Confederacy a belligerent in the war, one step shy of
recognition. They acted in unison in the possible recognition of the Confederacy as an
independent nation. 5 3 This infuriated William Seward, the American Secretary of State.
Lord Lyons and M. Mercier, English and French ministers to the United States, requested
an audience with Seward and demanded they be met with together. This was
unacceptable to Seward and Lincoln. Meeting with them together would only reassure
their commitment to join forces if the South were to be recognized.
To Jefferson Davis and Robert Toombs, the news that England and France
worked closely with one another during the American crisis was welcomed. If Toombs
could get the French to recognize the Confederacy as independent, that might bring in the
much more valuable prize, England. To achieve this goal, Toombs would have to
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promote the Napoleonic scheme in Mexico. Even though this was a quicker solution to
the recognition issue that plagued the Confederacy, endorsing a European scheme to
place a monarch on the throne of a nation in the western hemisphere, a region of the
world that has always cast them out, would go against the entire American way and the
American system and tradition. And, on top of all that, the European monarch would be
placed right on the border with the Confederate States of America-another concerning
issue. Despite George Washington's famous insistence that America was very distinct
from Europe and its ideas and President Monroe's outspoken opposition to any extension
of European influence into the New World, Toombs and Davis were willing to oppose
the ideals of fellow Southerners Washington and Monroe and make those concessions.54
Mexico was tom apart by yet another Civil War when Pickett arrived. Benito
Juarez was the leader of the liberal, anticlerical popular majority. His party was in
opposition against the Conservatives; they composed of property owners and good
churchmen, devoted to the restoration of the hierarchy and its ravished lands. 55 The
United States government formally recognized the Juarez regime as the legitimate
government in Mexico after Juarez defeated the Conservatives, led by Zuloaga. This was
bad news for Pickett and Toombs. If Zuloaga were to have won the Civil War, the
prospects of Mexican recognition of the Confederacy and the restoration of a European
monarch on the throne of Mexico would have improved dramatically. Davis and Toombs
decided to send Pickett despite their political setbacks in Mexico. They still needed that
relationship with the Mexican government to ensure victory over the Union. Forsyth
noted in a March 20, 1 86 1 letter to Davis that "recognition by Mexico would follow that
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of European powers as a matter of course. "56 Pickett would not be working alone in his
mission to Mexico; John Forsyth of Alabama and John Slidell of Louisiana joined him.
Pickett was no stranger to Mexico either. He left the army and bounced around the
Caribbean before landing as the United States consul at Vera Cruz between 1 856 and
1 859.57 These three men were among the most qualified men in North America to take on
Mexico. And luckily for the Confederacy, all three of these men joined the secession
movement and resign from their posts in the United States government to join Jefferson
Davis.
The Confederates needed to establish open and friendly relations with the people
of Mexico as soon as possible. They wanted to be in Mexico City and have a relationship
with the Mexican government before the Americans could gain any sort of diplomatic
advantage over the Confederates.58 The American diplomat sent from Washington D.C.
arrived in Mexico soon after Pickett. The Union sent Thomas Corwin to Mexico to thwart
any attempt by the Confederacy to establish a relationship with Mexico. 59

In

his

instructions from Seward, Corwin was to "not allude to the origin or causes of our
domestic difficulties in your intercourse with the government of Mexico."60 Seward and
Lincoln thought it best to downplay difficulties at home in order to help Union diplomats
on the ground. This fact was also mentioned to undermine any efforts by the Confederacy
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to establish a bond between the Confederates and Mexico. Corwin was the one man the
Confederacy did not want Lincoln and Seward to appoint to Mexico. Pickett hated
Corwin with a burning passion. Like Pickett, Corwin was from Kentucky. However,
Corwin moved to the North and served as the Governor of Ohio in 1 840 and secretary of
the treasury under President Fillmore. Corwin quickly became an outspoken critic of
slavery; his name was detested throughout the South.61 Corwin took his antislavery
rhetoric a step further when he was elected to the Senate in 1 845. There he attacked
President Polk and his actions and motives during the Mexican-American War. Corwin' s
outspoken nature won him favor in the North, but he was labeled a traitor in the South.62
Pickett had Central American experience, but his affiliation with the Confederacy proved
to be a handicap. The South dreamed of having a Central American and Caribbean
empire once they gained their independence. Mexico took note of this and remembered
this when Pickett arrived. 63
Corwin was charming, a born diplomat. His challenge to the Mexican-American
War in the late 1 840s helped his case dramatically. The Mexicans took to Corwin almost
instantly. The President of Mexico, Juarez, officially received Corwin on May 2 1 st, 1 86 1
and beamed during his reception of Corwin, stating with great certainty ''the desires of
the Government and the people of the United States of America for the prosperity and
well-being of the Government and the people of Mexico . . . are truly grateful because 1 am
convinced of their sincerity, and I recognize that they are dictated by a noble and
generous interest."64 Pickett had to convince the Mexican government that Davis was not
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the threat; Lincoln and the Union were the ones to fear. Pickett and the Confederacy
could offer greater protection to Mexico than the Union could. The Mexican-Confederate
boarder was the only part of the Confederate coast not covered by the federal blockade. It
could be here that supplies could be smuggled into the Confederacy and cotton and other
exports could be shipped to Europe from Mexico.65 The Confederates also had some
leverage over the Mexicans. Across that same frontier that goods could be shipped and
traded, troops could be moved as well. Pickett wanted to be friendly but forceful with the
Mexicans. As an opening gesture, he drafted a letter comparing Mexico and the
Confederacy in order to persuade Mexico that Davis and the South were not the hostile,
dangerous ones. Pickett noted how uprisings in both nations were founded in political
freedom from an oppressive government.66 Pickett's Jetter was picked up by the
Mexicans five days later. He was granted a personal, not official, audience with
Zamacona, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, at his home. 67 In his seven months
in the country, that was his only interview with a Mexican official. President Juarez never
met with the Confederate delegation, and his ministers gave the Confederates a wide
berth as well. Pickett managed to set up a meeting with a Mexican official but had not
obtained anything even closely resembling an alliance or trade agreement with Mexico.
The main reason Juarez resisted meeting with the Confederates was because he was busy
meeting with Corwin on a regular basis. The Confederates could give the Mexicans
promises and hopes, but the Union could give the Mexicans what they really needed,
money. Seward noted that Mexico, "instead of being benefited by the prostration or

65
66
67

Statesmen of the Lost Cause,

Ibid, 124.
Ibid, 125.

123.

36

obstruction of federal authority in this country, would be exposed by it to new and fearful
dangers."6 8 Those dangers included internal struggle within Mexico. However, the
Confederates were the real danger, according to Seward and Corwin.
Juarez and his government were not huge supporters of either the Union or the
Confederacy. Both sides of the Potomac were "gringos and therefore obnoxious to
patriotic Mexicans," claimed historian Burton Henrick. 69 The Union understood that for
good, effective diplomacy to work, Corwin could not play into that stereotype. In a letter
to Seward on June 29, 1 86 1 , Corwin remarked that Mexico regards "the United States as
its true and only reliable friend in any struggle which may involve the national
existence."7° Corwin went on to say how remarkable that is with the "deep prej udices
engendered in the general Mexican mind by the loss of Texas, which they attribute to our
citizens, and the compulsory cession of territory which was a consequence of our war
with them."7 1 Corwin was shocked when the Mexican government even talked to him
because of the strained past relationship between the United States and Mexico. This
realization went a long way in the negotiations. Juarez also worked with Corwin because
the Union had money that could potentially save him from European creditors. Mexico
had defaulted on its debts to England and France and had no hope of repaying them.
Juarez, in fact, had little control over Mexico. Opposition was still a threat and his people
were divided on his rule. Tax money and trade revenue were not enough to balance the
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budget, let alone pay the Europeans back. This offered the justification the European
powers were waiting for. They drew up a Convention with Spain for the seizure of
Mexican ports. 72
Corwin and Seward knew this played into the hands of the Confederacy if this
were to happen. Why not cut the Europeans off at the pass? Seward sent Corwin a note
telling him to work out a loan to Mexico from the United States for the liquidation of the
European debts. This money would pay back the Europeans, reestablish domestic order,
and make the Mexican government indebted to the Union. The agreement would not
''require the United States to assume any portion of the principle or interest of the debt of
Mexico or require the concurrence of the European powers."73 To ensure security of
repayment, Corwin added that the Mexican government gave over all public land and
mineral assets to the Americans as security. The treaty also included the Americans right
to seize those assets and the Mexican states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Lower California, and
Chihuahua if the Mexican government could not repay the loan within six years.74 There
was no possible way that Mexico would be able to repay the loans in six years, but Juarez
agreed. The treaty never went into effect, however. It was blocked by Congress because
the Federal Treasury was already overburdened, and England and France would not agree
to the terms.75 Still, even though this treaty was never signed or implemented, it was still
extremely valuable to the Union. The negotiations took over a year, and in that time,
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Juarez became more aligned to the Union with each passing day. Each day he met with
Corwin, he did not meet with Pickett. Also, the treaty blocked any hope of a Confederate
or European domination of Mexico or Central America. Corwin held the prospect of
ready money in front of Juarez the entire time he was in Mexico. The Americans
remained in control of the situation and the proceedings.
To add insult to injury for Pickett, none of his correspondence had been reaching
Toombs back in the Confederacy. For over half of a year, Pickett's superiors had no idea
what was going on in one of the most important nations in the world for Confederate
success. As part of the deal struck between Corwin and Juarez, the Mexican authorities
stopped mail between the Confederate delegation in Mexico and the Confederate
government.76 In essence, Pickett accomplished nothing in his seven months in Mexico.
He managed to gain only one audience with a Mexican official, he was diplomatically
outmaneuvered by Corwin, and none of his reports reached Toombs or Davis. After word
reached the delegation of the battle of Bull Run, Southerners in Mexico rejoiced;
meanwhile, the Union citizens in Mexico had little to celebrate. Pickett took offense ef at
some of the things being said by some Yankees and got into an altercation with "an
unlucky pill-vendor named Bennett."77 Pickett slapped him with the back of his hand.
This Southern gesture soon turned into a brawl. As a member of a diplomatic delegation,
Pickett assumed he would be treated with respect and be ordered to leave the country.
However, the Mexican government ordered an armed detail to arrest Pickett at his home
and treated him as an ordinary street brawler.78 He was thrown in jail and after twenty-
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four hours ordered to apologize to Bennett. This apology plus an indemnity would have
set Pickett free. However, Pickett refused and spent the next thirty days in the city jail.
He eventually bought his freedom and returned north as fast as he could. This humiliation
amounted to the perfect end to the Confederate attempts at recognition through Mexico.
His mission was a failure, and the Confederate hopes for recognition also ended in
failure.
Mexico was not the only target Davis and Toombs sent diplomats to in North
America. Toombs and the state department cast a massive net in terms of targets selected
for possible diplomatic relations, arguably too wide of a net. Like the mission to Mexico,
the Confederacy stuck close to home and sent a delegation to the maj or Native American
tribes on the western border of the Confederacy. At first, Toombs and Davis had little
concern for these tribes. In the larger diplomatic mission of the Confederacy, the tribes on
the western frontier were insignificant and on the periphery. Despite their remoteness,
Albert Pike, a charismatic Indian lawyer, originally from Massachusetts before moving
west to Arkansas, managed to convince both Davis and Toombs of the importance the
Native Americans could be to the Confederacy.
Albert Pike was born on December 29, 1 809 in Boston. His family soon moved to
his father's hometown of Newburyport, Massachusetts.79 Pike was charming, intelligent,
and ready for adventure. As he grew older, his sense of adventure and desire for ambition
grew as well. He left Massachusetts in 1 83 1 for St. Louis, and in 1 834, Pike found
himself in Little Rock, Arkansas. Here, Pike "proved himself adept in the political arena,
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and he also became a social lion in the village of Little Rock."8 0 As Pike grew in
popularity, he began writing articles for the Arkansas Advocate; Pike became so
successful writing for the Advocate, he bought the newspaper in 1 834. The ambitious
Pike, although a successful newspaper man, wanted more. This desire for furthering his
wealth and influence led Pike to the office of Judge Tomas Lacy of the Superior Court of
Arkansas. Pike requested a license from Judge Lacy to practice law. Lacy promptly
awarded Pike his license and remarked "granting a legal license was not like issuing a
medical diploma, and Pike could not kill anyone by practicing law."81 With this new
license, Pike threw himself into the territory-wide battle of statehood and what kind of a
state Arkansas would be, slave or free. Although Pike was born in Boston, he wooed the
wealthy planter class of southern Arkansas. He knew that this section of the Arkansas
population was influential and very wealthy. Pike aligned himself with these elite
members of society to increase his own standing. Pike became more and more noticed
and popular with his public fight for a slave Arkansas and representing the planters'
interests. During the debates at the convention, Pike saw the inaction and stalemates
between the slaveholders and non-slaveholders. He proposed a solution that he hoped
would end the bickering and get Arkansas admitted into the Union. His plan was that
state representatives be elected based on the free white male population, but the state
senate-be formed based on districts to give the southern part of the state greater power. 82
The convention adopted his plan, and Arkansas was admitted to the Union on June 1 5,
1 836.
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After this success, Pike sold his newspaper to work on his law practice full time.
Although Pike represented poorer clients, he focused his main efforts on the wealthy
planters, keeping those connections he had made during the statehood debates. These
planters kept Pike very busy in the years following statehood, and between 1 83 7 and
1 83 9, Pike participated in 23 out of the 7 1 cases brought before the Arkansas Supreme
Court.8 3 He became well versed in Arkansas law and well-integrated into Arkansas'
wealthy planter society. Despite his wealthy clientele, Pike needed to expand his client
base to make money. When Arkansas entered the Union in 1 836, the United States was
headed for a financial panic the following year. The newly formed state suffered greatly
during the panic and under the questionable leadership of President Andrew Jackson. The
wealthy planter class was severely damaged by the panic in 1 837. To make matters worse
for the already struggling planters, in 1 848, there was a severe drought, the following
year, there was a flood, and in 1 850, the cotton was planted late due to a spring frost. 84
For three seasons the cotton crop was virtually destroyed in Arkansas on top of the
damaged caused by the panic in 1 83 7. Being a resourceful and opportunistic man, Pike
tuned to the Native Americans to pad out his wallet while the planters got back on their
feet. In his circuit travels as a lawyer, Pike encountered Native Americans and their legal
battles with both the U.S. government and state government before. He even "prided
himself on the knowledge of the Indian character and language. He was so well liked by
the Indians that one of the tribes made him an honorary chief."85 It was this knowledge
and experience with the Native Americans that influenced both Toombs and Jefferson.
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Pike was both an experienced lawyer and knew his way around the western frontier, both
needed in his work with the Davis administration.
Arkansas left the Union on May 6, 1 86 1 after President Lincoln called for troops
to put down the rebellion. Despite Pike being born in the North, his very close ties with
the planter class and wealthy landowners in Arkansas compelled him to side with
Arkansas' decision to secede from the Union. Under the new Confederate Constitution
and the newly elected President Davis, the Confederate Bureau of Indian Affairs was
created; it was a subdivision under the war department. Its goal was to monitor and
negotiate relations with the Native Americans located in the Confederacy. At its creation,
the bureau "was placed under the direction of the Hon. David Hubbard, as Commissioner.
So far this Bureau has found but little to do."86 This letter was sent in April 1 86 1 and
since Arkansas would not join the Confederacy until May 1 86 1 , the war department, as
well as the state department, feared that the new bureau would be a waste of resources
and manpower that could be of use elsewhere in the Confederacy. After Arkansas left the
Union, this bureau proved vital in the management and forging of relationships with the
Native American tribes in the Confederacy, mainly the Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws,
and Chickasaws. Walker stressed that these were the most important Native American
tribes that the Confederacy had to befriend, or at least persuade them to remain neutral
during the war. He also looked to the future of the Confederacy and saw the potential
importance of the bureau establishing "future relations with the Territories of Arizona
and New Mexico."87 The Confederacy was confident in any area of government at the
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outbreak of the Civil War. The idea that Sec. Walker had his sights on the West so early
in 1 86 1 shows his level of confidence and faith in the Confederate cause.
Pike was the most successful Confederate commissioner of the war. Unlike his
counterparts in Mexico or Europe, Pike secured a total of eight treaties, all of which were
ratified by the Confederate Congress. Pike accomplished negotiating the treaties and
pushing them through the Confederate Congress by December 1 86 1 . He and his team
were masters at what they did. None of these treaties helped the Confederacy win
recognition, however. They were treaties of friendship and alliances between the
Confederacy and the Native Americans. From the perspective of recognition, Pike was
just as unsuccessful as his counterparts. However, based on the diplomatic success of
securing treaties with other nations/peoples, Pike was far and away a total success.
Pike's greatest accomplishment and most important treaty he negotiated was with
the Cherokee Nation and their chief, John Ross. The treaty was signed on October 7,
1 86 1 .

The main purpose of the treaty was to agree on "perpetual peace and friendship,

and an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Confederate States of America and
all of their States and people, and the Cherokee Nation and all of the people thereof."88
Although this treaty was not a formal treaty of recognition, the fact the Confederacy was
not viewed as a rebellion in the eyes of the Cherokee was a step in the right direction.
However, the Confederacy was not looking for recognition from the Native Americans.
Their opinion, in the grand scheme of international diplomacy and law, did not matter
when compared with England or France. Similar to the United States' treaties with the
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Native American tribes, Pike made sure that the Cherokee were "under the protection of
the Confederate States of America, and of no other sovereign power whatsoever."89
These established protectorate states ensured the United States, or the Confederacy,
would be the only nations to control and protect the Native Americans. The treaty also
protected slavery in the Cherokee Nation and remained "legal and has existed from time
immemorial."90 Pike wanted to show that the Confederacy was the right choice for the
Cherokee Nation going forward. With the treaty signed and ratified by the Confederate
Congress on December 1 1 , 1 86 1 , Pike had cemented open and friendly communication
with the Native American tribes on the western frontier. The Native Americans provided
some troops and assistance to the Confederacy during the war. That support and
friendship was rooted in the treaties Pike signed with numerous tribes.
The Confederate diplomatic missions in North America were an important
precursor to the main event in Europe. Both Mexico and the Native American tribes were
easily accessible and important early tests of Confederate diplomacy. Of the two
missions, the Mexico delegation was vastly more important for the ultimate Confederate
goal of recognition. That mission was a testing ground for the strategy of the Confederate
State Department. Ultimately, it was a failure. But, the early successes of the treaties with
the Native Americans gave false hope to Davis and the state department.
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Chapter Three: The Failure in France and The Russian Regret

With the mission in Mexico underway and spirits high in the new government, the
main thrust of Confederate diplomacy began: the mission to Europe. Unlike Mexico or
the Native Americans, the Confederacy needed European support diplomatically with
official recognition and public support, military support with the supply of arms, ships,
and intervention, and economic assistance with trade agreements to supply and feed the
new nation. Davis and the state department knew the importance of the mission.
However, Davis' background in the military and domestic politics led him to focus on
those aspects of the Confederacy, rather than the dozens of commissioners sent out to
conduct diplomacy. This lack of attention from Davis and constant rotation of secretaries
of state in Richmond led to a poor and often foggy foreign policy that hindered
commissioners in the field.
The two main targets in Europe were France and England. They were the two
major powers in Europe during the 1 860s and were the most able to assist the
Confederacy in securing independence. However, the Confederates had commissioners in
a multitude of other European nations fighting for the Cause. Belgium, Spain, Russia, and
the Pope were all contacted by the Confederates during the war. Toombs wanted to cast a
wide net in order to increase the likelihood of recognition from abroad. This was a good
strategy in theory. However, it stretched the already limited Confederate resources to
their limits.
On July 24, 1 86 1 , Robert Hunter was confirmed as the new Confederate secretary
of state to replace Robert Toombs. One month later, Hunter appointed John Slidell as the
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Confederate commissioner to France. Slidell was praised by both Davis and Hunter. In a
rousing endorsement of Slidell and his mission, Davis wrote, "for the purpose of stabling
friendly relations between the Confederate States and the Empire of France, and reposing
special trust and confidence in the integrity of prudence, and abilities of the Hon. John
Slidell, I have appointed him special commissioner of the Confederate States to the
Empire of France."91 Along with this general letter intended for French Foreign Office
officials, Davis sent a personal note to the French Emperor, Napoleon III. Davis
described Slidell as "one of our most intelligent, esteemed, and worthy citizens."92 Davis
hoped Slidell would cultivate friendly relations with the French Emperor and the foreign
minister, Edouard Antoine de Thouvenel. The new secretary of state also penned a
rousing endorsement of Slidell in his letter accompanying Slidell' s credentials. Hunter
reinforced that Jefferson Davis is "animated by a desire to unite and bind together our
respective countries by friendly ties and has appointed the Hon. John Slidell, one of our
most esteemed and trustworthy citizens, as special commissioner of the Confederate
States to the Government of France."93 Both Hunter and Davis looked to the French for
support against the Union, and they believed John Slidell was the man who could
accomplish this goal.
Before Slidell had the chance to arrive in Paris, the Union delegation was already
well established, or so they thought. The American minister in France was Charles J.
Faulkner. He was born in Virginia and appointed by President James Buchanan to be the
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United States Minister to France in

1 860;

he served in that role until

1 86 1 .

Faulkner was

a pro-southern advocate and a supporter of secession. He worked on delaying the
Unionist support in France. This Confederate sympathy would catch up with Faulkner.
When he resigned his commission in

1 86 1

and pledged his allegiance to the Confederate

States of America, he became an enemy to the United States. The charges against Mr.
Faulkner were "the successful efforts to procure arms for the rebels and the fact that he
was going home to assume command of a regiment of rebels who had elected him
colonel."94 The arrest of Faulkner ''caused great excitement here [the Union]. Among
Union men it is regarded with the highest favor, as indicating the final determination of
the Government to prevent any further collusion between the rebels of the South and of
the loyal States."95 Faulkner's arrest was big news. To William Seward, the secretary of
state in the Lincoln cabinet, it was disturbing. Faulkner managed to make a deal with an
arms manufacturer in France to help supply the Confederates. This damaged the
reputation of the Union in the court of Napoleon III. Seward quickly found a replacement
for Faulkner.
The Union replacement for Faulkner was William Dayton from New Jersey.
William Seward regarded Dayton's task as ''a very important foreign mission at a
moment when our domestic affairs have reached a crisis."96 The nation had boiled over
into a civil war because of, according to Dayton, "plethora and abundance." He went on
to say, during a speech in Paris, that the Confederacy is an "outbreak of a restless and
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excitable people who complain substantially of nothing."97 Dayton saw the rebellion like
a parent sees a spoiled child throwing a tantrum, unnecessary and for no good reason.
The South had nothing to complain about, according to Dayton, and, since they did not
get their way entirely, they were rebelling. That was not a justification, in Dayton' s view,
of the South leaving the Union and starting a civil war. Dayton saw the Constitution "not
as compact between states, to be broken, with or without cause, at the option of any, but
it is a nation, treated with as such, recognized as such, by every civilized power on the
face of the earth."98 This was a very strong and committed interpretation of the
Constitution. Dayton was an adamant Unionist, unlike his predecessor Faulkner. Seward
and Lincoln trusted him to do his job and support the federal government back in
Washington D.C.
Dayton' s instructions came in a rambling letter from William Seward on the 22nd
of April

1 86 1 .

Despite the length of the letter, Seward told Corwin that the French must

not support the Confederate States of America under any circumstances. Seward
implored Dayton to explain to the Emperor all of the good qualities and amazing things
the United States has been able to accomplish in its short lifespan. The United States "has
risen from insignificance to be the second in the world. Leaving out of view unimportant
local instances of conflict, we have only had two foreign wars . . . and not one human life
has hitherto been forfeited for disloyalty to the government."99 Seward attempted to
evoke American stability and prosperity. His viewpoint was obviously biased. However,
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Seward ' s point of American exceptional ism was part of h i s strategy to prevent the
European powers from recognizing the Confederates. Seward also justified the South
leaving the Union to himself in this letter to Dayton. He was b affled as to why the South
would leave this great and prosperous Union and give up their rights in the Constitution.
Seward reminded both Dayton and Napoleon III that "many nations have taken [the
Constitution] as a mode l . " France epically, Seward stated, was "bu i lt on the same broad
foundation with that of this federal republic." 1 00 The United States ' goal was only to
prevent France from recognizing the Confederacy or intervening in any way. Lincoln
''neither expects nor desires any intervention, or even any favor, from the government of
France, or any other, in this emergency. " 1 0 1 Lincoln and Seward wanted Dayton to
maintain the status quo antebellum between France, nothing more. Lincoln and the Union
army would crush the rebellion without the support of France or any other power; the
American Civil War was just that, a conflict that should be contained to America. The
United States did not need any help solving its internal affairs. This was a bold claim by
Lincoln, and something of a gamble. It shut the door of any possible help from a
potentially sympathetic France, or any European power, in the future should the United
States need it to quell the rebellion.
The French leader at the time of the Civil War was Napoleon III. He dreamed of
remaking the French Empire as great as it was under Napoleon back in the early 1 800s.
He also dreamed of expanding the French holdings in the New World. The French
foreign minister Thouvenel was a good indication of how the French public felt about the
Civil War in America and of the Confederate States of America. He detested slavery, like

100
101

Ibid.
Ibid, 200.

50

most of h i s countrymen, was more concerned with Italian uni fication on h i s nation's
border and was not troubled with the Union in turmoil thousands of miles away across
the Atlantic Ocean. 1 02 Thi s preconceived attitude made S l i de l l ' s job that much more
d i fficult. Another strike against S l i dell was the French press. It attacked the South ' s u se
of slavery, praised the free labor in the North, and questioned secession. 1 03 However
supportive the French press was of the North, France, at the time, was not a democracy
with the freedom of the press. It was ruled by an imperial dictator who had his own
newspapers and ··official" news outlets. This imperial press was pro-Southem. 1 04
Napoleon I I I was also friends with John S lidell and his fellow Confederate
commissioners. This close relationship was formed at the very arrival of S lidell and his
entourage. One of Sl idel l' s associates, Edwin Leon, proc laimed that the French Emperor
was ''in the house next to my hote l . " 1 05 This close proximity offered Confederate
diplomats easier access to the Emperor and his ministers. The French government
constantly saw S lidell and met with him. This was in stark contrast to his counterpart in
England, James Mason, who rarely met with English officials in either a formal or
informal fashion. 1 06 S lidell had the ear of the Emperor and his ministers, but so did
Dayton. Both men secured numerous appointments with Napoleon III or his ministers
during the war. The success or failure of either diplomatic mission came down to
personal skill and Emperor' s desire to listen to either side.
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A prominent meeting between S lidell and the Emperor took place on October

1 862.

28,

S lidell met with Napoleon III to push France towards recognition yet again. The

Emperor ·'had no scruples in declaring that h i s sympath ies were entirely with the South,"
but the Emperor was worried that "'if he acted alone, England, instead of fo l lowing h i s
example, would endeavor t o embroil with the United States and that French commerce
would be destroyed . " 1 07 This was an important meeting because it strongly showed the
Emperor ' s personal support for the Confederacy. Despite the support of the French
Emperor, S lidell and the Confederacy had to either convince Napoleon III to act alone or
James Mason and S lidell had to convince both England and France to work together. In
an effort to further push the Emperor away from the English question, S lidell informed
the Emperor that the recognition of the Confederacy would not mean war with the Union.
S l idell and the Confederacy only ''asked for recogn ition, satisfied that the moral effect of
such a step . . . would exercise a contro l l ing influence.'' 1 08 S lidell pushed the idea that the
North, after hearing of French, and possibly of English, recognition of the Confederacy
would come to the table and negotiate an armistice and eventual peace agreement.
However, in the event of war with the United States, S lidell attempted to put the Emperor
at ease. The American navy '·would be swept from the ocean and a l l their principle ports
effic iently blockaded by a moiety of h i s [French] marine.'' 1 09 Slidell played down the
power of the Union industry and military. He was confident that the Union would exhaust
itself by staying in the war. This was the most important item to make the Emperor aware
of. The Union "energies and resources were already taxed to their utmost by the war . . .
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and the Lincoln admini stration, ''sti l l had sense enough not t o seek a quarrel with the first
power in the worl d . " 1 1 0 The Union, according to S lidell was hardly able to stay in the war
against the Confederates, let alone fight a multifront war with European superpowers.
The E mperor proposed a mediation of France, England, and Russia between the North
and South. Napoleon III suggested the mediation could be urged "on the h i gh grounds of
humanity and the interests of the whole civilized world. If it be refused by the North, it
will afford good reason for recognition and perhaps for more active interventi on." 1 1 1 This
mediation never occurred. France, England, and Russia could not agree on the terms and
the Union would have never accepted the meditation even if it had occurred.
S lidell and the Confederate diplomatic mission in France was quickly falling
apart. By the end of

1 862, the window for recognition was fading. The military

campaigns in the West were dominated by Union armies, and in the eastern theater, the
balance of power was starting to shift. S lidell and his team did their best. However, the
military reality on the ground was not helping their case. Despite the setbacks, Slidell did
manage to negotiate a loan with Messrs. Emile Erlanger & Co. They conducted business
with the Confederacy in the form of cotton bonds and channeled French money i nto the
Southern railroads. S lidell was approached by the company while in Paris and the agents
representing Messrs. Emile Erlanger & Co. "presented themselves to me [ S l idell] without
any suggestions on m y part of a desire to borrow money for the Confederate States.' ' 1 1 2
The business ties between the Confederate States and France were strong. The business
sector realized the importance of southern cotton and the market they generated for
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French businesses. The loan was

$ 1 5,000,000 repayable in gold or cotton bonds. This

loan was one of the biggest accomplishments of S lidell in Paris. To Slidell, the loan
represented '"financial recognition of our [Confederate] independence, emanating from a
class proverbially cautious and l ittle given to be influenced by sentiment or sympathy. " 1 1 3
This loan, given by a French banking firm, was proof to Slidell that France recognized
the Confederate States of America as a sovereign, independent nation. The wealthy class
of French society did not hand out loans on the good graces of their heart. They believed
in who they loaned to and the Confederates, especially S lidell, saw that as proof of their
legal existence in the world of nations. However, his translation of a large loan from a
French firm to the global community recognizing the legitimacy of the Confederate
States of America proved to be a false comparison.
The Confederate efforts in France were extensive and well calculated. S lidell
knew his mission and the obj ectives he was supposed to accomplish during his trip.
S lidell had numerous, although unofficial, meetings with Emperor N apoleon I I I that were
friendly and cordial. The Emperor favored the Confederate States and the breakup of the
Union. H owever, S lidell could not convince the French ruler to act on his personal
convictions. It seemed as if the Confederates were in a position in France to best the
Union and acquire a friend. But, the Emperor did not act without the English support.
S lidell and his delegation could not manage to sway a friendly, sympathetic government
to support their cause. D ayton and the Union managed to outmaneuver Slidell and the
Confederate diplomatic operations in France.
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Another important minor power in Europe was Russia. Under the rule of Czar
Alexander II and on the fringes of Europe, Russia had just got out of the Crimean War in

1 856. It lost to an alliance between France, England, and the Ottoman Empire. It was a
humiliating defeat for Russia and the czar. France and England succeeded in propping up
the Ottoman Empire, which was in decline. The West needed a counterweight to Russian
expansion and the Ottomans were strategically located to provide that balance to the
rising Russian power. After the war, Russia was diplomatically isolated from the rest of
Europe. Its alliances with Austria and others were dismantled and Russia was left to fend
for itself. Russia received little to no help in the years following the war. It was clear that
France and England had other priorities. This diplomatic isolation and hatred towards
England and France played a role in the foreign relations during the American Civil War.
With England and France leaning towards the Confederacy initially, Russia went in the
opposite direction.
In the family of nations, Russia sought support from the United States-her one
potential ally. In the years leading up to the Civil War, Russian Minister P lenipotentiary
to the United States, Eduard de Stoeckl did his best to charm Washington D . C . He first
came to the United States in

1 84 1 as an attache from the Russian government. He was

then promoted after the death of Alexander Bodisco in

1 854. 1 14 Stoeckl managed to keep

warm, friendly relations with the United States during the Crimean War, and he hoped to
achieve the same success during the American Civil War. Stoeckl enjoyed entertaining
guests, and although very sociable, was very observant and tactical. Because he rubbed
elbows with so many representatives in D . C . , he was well aware of the sectional crisis
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brewing in the United States; it deeply concerned Stoeckl. His knowledge of the crisis led
him to keep the Russian government well informed as well . This vital information was
crucial to the decision-making being made by top Russian officials in St. Petersburg. An
intact Union provided a counterweight to England and France. The Russians needed a
strong United States for their own diplomatic and economic advantage. 1 1 5
The United States sent Cassius C lay, a Kentucky native with strong ambitions to
end slavery, to Russia to fight for the Union cause. Clay was born on October

1 9, 1 8 1 0

in

Madison County, Kentucky. 1 1 6 Clay was born into a family rich in history, lineage, and
wealth. His father was one of the biggest slave owners in the state of Kentucky and C lay
.. began to study the system, or, rather, began to feel its wrongs ." 1 1 7 Clay' s exposure to
slavery and the brutality that accompanied the system never left him in adulthood. The
images of plantations and the slaves who worked the fields and in homes helped C lay
mold and shape his antislavery position later in life. However, early life for C lay revolved
around his father, Green Clay. His wealth, power, and influence opened many doors for
Cassius and his brothers. Clay ' s father encouraged Cassius to acquire as m uch education
as he could. So, in

1 827,

he enrolled in the Jesuit College of St. Joseph in Bardstown,

Kentucky. 1 1 8 Clay was a good student in college. He was smart, diligent, and persistentall great qualities for a diplomat. In a twist of irony however, C lay struggled the most
with his French studies, the diplomatic language used in Europe. In

1 83 1 ,

Clay departed

Kentucky for Yale Col lege in New Haven. While in New England, Clay' s perspective
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was drastically shifted. While in N ew England, C lay met with former President John
Quincy Adams, S enator Daniel Webster, and sent letters to President Andrew Jackson.

1 19

Clay wanted to expand his view of politics beyond the planter elite he grew up around in
Kentucky. These influential political leaders, his studies at Yale College, and a chance
meeting with William Lloyd Garrison, who had just begun publishing the Liberator, all
1
made huge impressions on C lay, especially Garrison. 20 Garrison ' s fi ery rhetoric about
abolitionism and the immorality of slavery stuck with C lay. Along with the seeds of
abolitionism, C lay also observed a free labor economy in New England. He witnessed
people living in prosperity on soil that was of the poorest of quality. In the South, soil
quality and wealth went hand-in-hand. The people of the South generated the vast
majority of wealth from the ground. In N ew England, C lay observed mobility in the
market and the mobility of wealth.
C lay returned to Kentucky a changed man. He saw the progress in New England
and wanted the same for his home state of Kentucky. He saw potential for Kentucky to
rise above the need for slavery and diversify and industrialize its economy. C lay foresaw
himself as the lead politician for the rebirth of the Kentucky economy. He aligned
himself with the non-slaveholders in Kentucky. Clay envisioned a robust and diversified
economy much in the way H enry C lay had with his American S ystem. In

1 834, C lay was

elected to the Kentucky House of Representatives. He served three terms and was voted
1 1
out due to his growing calls for abolition in Kentucky. 2 He survived an assassination
attempt in
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to shoot Clay. However, Clay overpowered him and killed him with his Bowie knife. 1 22
Clay fought for his cause and had nearly been killed because of it. This attempt on his life
did not stop Clay from his antislavery grandiloquence. In
antislavery newspaper in Kentucky,

The True American.

1 845, Clay started his own
This is where the influence of

Garrison shines for Clay. His antislavery message in Kentucky was not popular. Clay' s
press was run out of Kentucky after a mob came to bum it down only months after its
first publication. 1 2 3 He moved the paper to Cincinnati, Ohio. At the time it was a leader in
abolition and a safe space for Clay to print. He still resided in Kentucky after moving his
paper, however. Clay continued to influence politics in Kentucky despite his paper being
across the river in Ohio. When war broke out with Mexico in

1 846, Clay j oined the 1 st

Kentucky Calvary, or the "Old Infantry" company. C lay served as their captain after
bribing the commanding officer Captain James Jackson to step down. 1 24 Clay went off to
war in staunch opposition to it. An extreme Whig, Clay was in the minority who opposed
President Polk' s declaration of war from the very beginning. Like many Whigs, Clay
believed President Polk used the Mexican American War as a means to expand slavery
into the western territories.
Clay served one year as a volunteer during the war. He returned home in

1 84 7 and

saw the nation in conflict over the war. The Whig Party was starting to come apart over
the issue of the war and how extreme its policy should be over slavery and its expansion.
Clay was looking for a way out of the Whig Party before it totally collapsed. He wanted
to save his political career. The Whigs were losing power in Kentucky and around the
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nation. The Free-Soil Party, founded in

1 848, attracted Clay after the party split the vote

and allowed Zachary Taylor to win the presidency. The potential of the party grew on
Clay and he saw the power of antislavery sentiment on a national scale rather than on a
state scale. 1 2 5 In

1 854, a new political party entered the scene, the Republican Party. Clay

j oined immediately. The Free-Soil Party had paved the way for a party to oppose slavery.
He fought for but did not secure the nomination in
C. Fremont. The Republican Party won in the

1 856 for president. That went to John

1 860 election and Abraham Lincoln took

notice of Clay' s history of opposing slavery, his "conversion" from a slaveholder to a
man screaming for abolition, and Clay ' s persistence. Despite those positive qualities,
Lincoln found Clay too warlike for a prominent cabinet position. The Union was hanging
in the balance and Lincoln feared C lay might push it over the edge. 1 2 6 William Seward, a
friend of C lay, offered him a position in the State Department. Seward nominated C lay
Minister to Russia. Clay was appointed on March

2 8, 1 86 1 by Lincoln.

C lay' s mission to Russia was simple and direct : maintain the current friendly
relations with the Russian Emperor and prevent the Confederate States from swaying the
Russian government towards recognition. As usual, Seward provided his diplomats with
material and talking points to get the diplomacy off to a strong start. These points gave
the Union diplomats an edge because they were well crafted and thought through in great
detail. Clay' s talking points were no exception. Seward reminded C lay, ··Russia, like the
United States, is an improving and expanding empire. Its track is eastward, while that of
the United States is westward. The two nations, therefore, never come into rivalry or

125
126

Ibid, 149.
I bid, 169.

59

contl ict. " 1 2 7 The United States had no reason to quarrel with Russia. The two nations
stood on opposite ends of the globe and left one another to their own devices. The
Russians were not players in the Atlantic trade like the English or the French. The United
States did not need to worry about the Russians interfering. S eward wanted Clay to
broach a wide range of topics while in Russia as well . The primary goal was dealing with
the Confederacy. However, the Union still had other matters to attend to . Clay was
in structed to ''inqu ire whether the sluggish course of commerce between the two nations
cannot be quickened, and its volume i ncreased . " 1 2 8 Seward also thought ahead to the
Union after the war. He was concerned over the issue of free travel between the two
nations. The U nited States allowed Russians to "cross th i s western continent without
once being required to exhibit a passport. Why will not Russia extend the same
hospitality to us . . . . " 1 2 9 This freedom to travel was an extension of the equality of man
principle that Seward, Clay, and other fervent abolitionists believed in. S eward and C lay
warned the Russian czar that if the United States were to be broken into two republics,
"the equil ibrium of nations, maintained by th is republic, on the one side, against the
European system on the other continent, would be lost, and the struggles of nations i n
that system for dominion in this hem isphere and o n the h i gh seas . . . would b e renewed.
The progress of freedom . . . would be arrested, and the hopes of humanity . . . would be
d i sappointed and indefin itely postponed .'' 1 3 0 Seward obviously had an American bias and
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overstated the importance of the United States, at the time, in the global system.
However, the point was to prove to the czar and the Russian government that they needed
the United States as one united nation to stop the western Europeans from dominating the
globe and starting further wars. At the end of the letter, in clear and direct language,
Seward explained that the United States "'refrai ns from all intervention whatever in their
political affairs; and i t expects the same just and generou s forbearance i n retu m . " 1 3 1 The
United States desired to conduct its affairs w ith Russia as if the Civil War was not raging
on. The United States drafted the Monroe Doctrine to keep European powers out of the
western hemisphere and followed a policy of non-interventionism. The fact the United
States was engulfed in a civil war, according to Lincoln and Seward, did not change that
fact. This demand was strategically placed at the end of the letter as a point of emphasis
and to draw the attention of the reader.
On July

1 4, 1 86 1 , Clay met with the Russian Emperor, Alexander IL He was very

receptive and friendly with the American delegation. Clay remarked 0ft how the Emperor
""had hopes of the perpetuity of the friendship between the two nations now, that i n
addition t o a l l former ties we were bound together b y a common sympathy i n the
common cause of emancipation.'' 1 3 2 Alexander II issued his own version of the
Emancipation Proclamation in March

1 86 1 that freed all the surfs in Russia. Alexander II

viewed the Civil War in term s of slavery versus abolition. The Union ' s goal of abolition
came much later in the conflict. Nonetheless, the Emperor saw his interests and ideals
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aligned with the U n ion rather than the Confederacy. Clay ' s mi ssion i n

1 86 1 was a breeze

compared to his counterparts in England or France. He worked with a very sympathetic
government from the outset of the war. The Russians understood that the United States
was a vital ally against the French and the British. Russia and the Emperor understood
that a strong U . S . could stand up against the threat of western European aggression and
economic dominance.
The Union diplomats in Russia had no Confederate diplomatic competition in

1 86 1 . Clay had the ear and full attention of the Russian government, and the Emperor
was all ears. He was happy to hear the Union delegation speak. Soon, he and C lay
developed a personal relationship alongside of their working relationship. Davis and
Judah Benj amin had focused all of their attention on France and England for diplomatic
support. Benj amin sent Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar II of Georgia and Mississippi
to represent the Confederate interests in Russia. On November

1 9, 1 862, Lamar was

appointed Special Commissioner to Russia. Benj amin sent Lamar a letter detailing his
nomination and mission in Russia. The Civil War raged for one year before any
Confederate commissioner was nominated to head up relations with the Russian
government. Benjamin warned Lamar that "our offers to enter into amicable relations
with the great powers of Europe, whose proximity caused them to be first visited by our
commissioners, naturally created some hesitation in approaching his Imperial Majesty
Alexander II." 1 33 The Confederate government had sent their best diplomats to the French
and English courts right after the war began. Russia was geographically and politically
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insignificant when compared with England or France, based on the Confederate
diplomatic goals. Lamar left for Russia in

1 863 . He arrived in London a few weeks later

and awaited further instructions from Benj amin. Those instructions never came from
Richmond. What did come was a notice that "the Senate fai led to ratify my [Lamar]
nomination as commissioner to Russia." Add ing, "'the President desires that I consider the
official information of the fact as term inating my m i ssion ." 1 34 The Confederate mission
to Russia never made it to St. Petersburg or even to mainland Europe. Lamar met with
Mason and S lidell while in London. He was briefed on the status of their missions.
However, his own mission was not seen as important in

1 863 . The Russians were far

away and in the pocket of Clay and the Union.
The Russians had a militarily centered goal in supporting the Union as well as a
political one. Since the United States was so friendly w ith the government of Alexander
II, the Emperor decided to send two fleets, one to S an Francisco and one to New York in

1 863 . The Americans saw this as proof of the Russian support for the Union and a step
towards intervention. However, the Russians needed somewhere remote to hide their
navy in the event of a war with England or France over the issue of the Confederacy. In
New York, the fleet arrived in S eptember
frigate

Osliaba,

1 863 . The New York Times noted the '"Russian

which has lain at anchor in our harbor for several days past, and has been

an obj ect of so much interest to our citizens, is about to be reinforced by a fleet of four or
five vessels of the same nationality." 1 35 The Russian fleet was the obj ect of attention and
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admiration. It reassured Union leaders that they had outside support for the war, even if it
was in Ru ssia' s strategic i nterest to dock their fleet in American ports.
The missions in France and Russia demonstrate the struggle of the Confederate
diplomats. France used the Civil War as an opportunity to attempt to restore a European
monarchy on the throne of a weak Mexico. The Confederates could not convince France
to join the war because they were planning their own with Mexico. Although sympathetic
to the Confederate cause, Napoleon I I I had his own ambitions and Slidell was not able to
reign him in. This was a maj or diplomatic failure for the Confederacy. France had been
an early supporter of the independence of the Confederacy, more so than England. The
failure to obtain recognition from France only left England as an option. The
Confederates shot themselves in the foot with their ' tunnel vision ' diplomacy with
England and France. The Confederate State Department and Davis were so concerned
about the English and the French that they ignored many potential friends. Russia was in
support of the Union from the outset. However, Davis and the Confederates failed to send
an envoy to Alexander I I . The Confederates needed support from wherever they could
find it, and their inability to engage Russia shows how focused, too focused, they were on
France and England. Now with the Russian and the French missions a failure, Mason and
his associates in London were Dav is' last hope at recognition.
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Chapter Four: Essential England
For the Confederates, England was the ultimate prize. She ruled the seas and was
the world ' s economic and m ilitary superpower. England carried an enormous amount of
soft power as wel l . The Queen and her government influenced what other European
nations did or did not do. This power was also a target of the Confederates . They needed
the soft power of England to persuade other European governments to recognize the
Confederacy. No nation wanted to stand alone or take the lead in recognizing the
Confederate States of America. The soft power could be used, alongside hard power, to
pressure the Union to the bargaining table. These lofty hopes could not be realized
without first convincing the British the Confederacy was in fact a legitimate nation
worthy of nationhood.
Davis first appointed William Yancey to England. Yancey, a native of Alabama,
was a staunch defender of slavery and states' rights. He was cold, harsh, and arrogant.
Yancey was passed over for the Confederate presidency and neither Davis nor Yancey
forgot about that. Yancey had no diplomatic experience before his appointment to head
the Confederate delegation to Europe. The political instability Yancey caused Davis and
the Democratic Party in

1 860 made Yancey a target of Davis. The new nation could not

afford political enemies, and Davis "banished" Yancey to England. On March

1 6, 1 86 1 ,

Robert Toombs notified Yancey, Pierre Rost, and Dudley Mann of their appointment as
special commissioners of the Confederate States to Europe. 1 36 While in England Yancey
continued his habit of arrogance and brashness. British Foreign Secretary Lord John
Russell refused to meet with Yancey in any formal capacity. Yancey, a strong supporter
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of slavery, was in sharp contrast to Russell. The two men did not get along and their
relationship represented the lack of success of Yancey as a diplomat. 1 37 The slow work of
diplomacy and the inaction of the British government discouraged Yancey. He did not
want a diplomatic post. He accepted the position from Davis after he failed to secure a
position in the president' s cabinet. The lack of progress paired with Yancey's harshness
and lack of passion for the job culminated in his resignation in late August. It was
received by the new Secretary of State Robert Hunter on September 23, 1 86 1 . In his reply
to Yancey, Hunter "communicated the request to the President. . . and he accepts your
resignation with regret."1 3 8 Yancey did not leave Europe until his replacement, James
Mason arrived. However, Mason and his counterpart John Slidell would not make it to
Europe until 1 862.
Mason was born November 3, 1 798 on Analostan Island (present day Theodore
Roosevelt Island) in the Potomac River. 1 39 Mason enjoyed a wealthy upbringing. His
family was social, not only with themselves, but with the surrounding community. The
proximity to the nation' s capital also influenced Mason. His father exposed him to
politics at an early age. He often brought Mason on trips to the Capitol. Mason was
drawn to the debates in Congress. 1 40 Mason, having seen and been a part of the
Congressional debates in and around the War of 1 8 1 2, was mesmerized by the skill and
tact of the congressmen. His love for politics and the law grew out of these experiences
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with his father. Mason graduated from University of Pennsylvania in 1 8 1 8 after much
protesting from his father. Mason went on to earn a law degree from the College of
William and Mary in 1 820. 14 1 The law degree allowed Mason to venture out on his own,
away from the shadow cast by his father. He set up his own law practice in Winchester,
Virginia after graduating from William and Mary. This firm gave Mason the
independence he craved, and the financial stability allowed Mason to look to the world of
politics.
His entrance into politics was not glorious or impressive. Mason was elected to
the Virginia House of Delegates in 1 826. He had a very strict interpretation of the
Constitution. 1 42 He viewed the states as the locus of power in the United States, not the
federal government. However, in the following year, Mason lost his reelection bid
because he voted against a resolution to build roads and canals and other internal
improvements in Virginia, something his constituents obviously wanted. He left office
and returned home to practice law full time and be with his family. Despite being voted
out of office, Mason was persistent. In 1 828, he was appointed to serve as a delegate to
the state convention for Andrew Jackson. And in March 1 828, Mason was nominated to
the House of Delegates by the Jacksonians. 1 43 Mason finished second in the race but for
the House of Delegates, the two nominees with the most votes are elected. Again, Mason
did not win elections by landslides or blowouts. His strict reading of the Constitution was
a turnoff to many voters in the late 1 820s and early 1 830s. He served in the House of
Delegates until 1 83 1 . Mason once again lost his reelection bid and did not return to
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politics until he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1 83 7 . 1 44 He was ousted
from the House just two years later. Not by the voters but by the Democratic Party.
Mason was too outspoken and was teetering on radical views. 145 Mason was again out of
political office. His life out of the political arena was not much of a spectacle. He
practiced law and provided for his family. Being a good father to his kids was a top
priority for Mason when he was not serving the State of Virginia. However, during his
time away, Mason was itching to return to politics.
In 1 84 7, Mason received an opening in the Senate after the death of Isaac
Pennybacker. 1 46 Mason was elected to fill the vacancy left by Pennybacker. Upon his
arrival to the Senate, Mason opened with a defense of slavery. Although Mason argued
for and was a defender of slavery, his reasoning was rooted in the defense of private
property from federal interference. This belief sprang from his strict construction of the
Constitution. Mason also argued the Founding Fathers intended the federal government to
handle foreign affairs while domestic affairs were under the authority of the states. 1 47
Mason disliked any growth in federal power. He strongly opposed a bill to create the
Department of the Interior. The increase in size of the central government was never a
good idea. Mason made his mark in the Senate during the sectional crisis in the years
following the Mexican American War. As with many of his Southern and Northern
countrymen, the years following the Mexican American War molded the policy and
mindset those men would hold during the secession winter of 1 860 and throughout the
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American Civil War. Mason drafted the now infamous bill known as the Fugitive Slave
Law as part of the compromise measures between the North and the South in 1 850. 148
This bill became part of a larger set of bills known as the Compromise of 1 850. The
Fugitive Slave Law of 1 850 made each and every citizen, North or South, responsible for
the recapture of runaway slaves. The bill required that all escaped slaves must be returned
to their masters upon capture with the help and cooperation of all citizens. Mason
realized that the bill had to have Northern support and participation to succeed. 1 49 His
time in the Senate was defensive, outspoken, and fervent. Mason defended his beliefs to
the extreme while in the Senate. He often sparred with New England Senators over the
issue of slavery and its legality. He was a passionate southerner, but Mason was loyal to
Virginia and his interpretation of the Constitution.
Slavery was debated by Mason numerous times during his stay in the Senate.
However, Mason discussed foreign relations more often than any other issue, including
slavery. 1 50

In

1 852, Mason became the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. It

is here that Mason gained his knowledge and love for international relations. His work on
the committee seldom made headlines. Mason focused on fostering friendly relations
with other governments. This skill along with other diplomatic and negotiating skills
served Mason extremely well when he served as the Confederate commissioner to
England. Mason served in the chairman role with the utmost dignity and professionalism.
His deep-rooted nationalism also shined through while chairman. Mason pushed for bills
that sought to diffuse tensions between England and the United States to further settle the
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Washington Territory, and he also wanted the boundary with both Mexico and Canada
clearly defined and any conflicts resolved. And, despite his quarrels with New England
representatives over slavery, Mason supported the New Englanders in their dispute with
England and Canada regarding the fisheries off the Canadian coast. 1 51 Mason 's
nationalism and strong will to accomplish what he set out to do fueled his successes on
the Foreign Relations Committee. His work helped him when he served the Confederate
State Department. Mason resigned from the Senate in 1 86 1 after the secession of Virginia
to the Confederate States of America.
On the same day Hunter penned his reply to Yancey accepting his resignation,
Hunter informed Mason ''the President desires you that you should proceed to London
with as little delay as possible, and place yourself as soon as you may be able to do so in
communication with the Govemment."15 2 Mason, once in England, had to mend the
relations with Secretary Russell and correct the damage caused by Yancey. Hunter also
gave Mason new instructions and directions after taking over after the resignation of
Robert Toombs. Mason had to reconstruct the image of the Confederacy in the 1::!yes of
the British government. The Confederacy, according to Hunter, should "not be viewed as
revolted provinces or rebellious subjects seeking to overthrow the lawful authority of a
common sovereign. Neither are we warring for rights of a doubtful character or such as
are to be ascertained only by implication." 1 53 Hunter made the case that the Confederacy
was indeed a legitimate nation with rights and goals and aspirations. The Confederate
States of America was not a rebellion, but a lawful assertion of rights given to each state
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in the Union. The North was the oppressor, and the South broke away to defend itself
from that aggression. Hunter, after only five months of fighting, characterized the war as
"the most sanguinary and barbarous war which has been known for centuries among
civilized people." 1 54 Hunter evoked the horrors of the war in an attempt to sway England
to save the peace-loving people of the Confederacy from the warmongering Union. An
independent Confederacy "would exercise not a disturbing but a harmonizing influence
on human society, for it would not only desire peace itself but to some extent become a
bond of peace amongst others."155 Mason was instructed to convey that message of peace
and unity to the British government and "when you [Mason] are officially recognized by
the British Government and diplomatic relations between the two countries are thus fully
established, you will request an audience with her Majesty." 1 5 6 Hunter was quite
optimistic about Mason and his abilities to secure official diplomatic relations with
England. His faith in Mason rejuvenated the Southern State Department. Mason' s success
in England was Confederate success as well; the two were interlocked. Hunter and Davis
wanted to get Mason to England as soon as possible to replace Yancey.
Mason' s trip to England was fraught with danger. He was not appointed until late
September and by then, the Union had established their blockade of the Confederacy.
Mason would have to sail through the blockade to a British controlled island in the
Caribbean to safely navigate the blockade. Mason arranged transport via the steamer
Gordon for the sum of $5,000 which the government of the Confederacy would have to
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pay. 1 57 Slidell and Mason left the following night and ran the blockade to Cuba. Mason
and Slidell arrived in Cuba on the 1 8th of October. Mason reported his safe arrival to
Hunter and added that "a rain came on at the last moment of our departure, which
increasing the darkness the better enabled us to elude the blockading squadron." 1 58
Unfortunately for Mason and Slidell, their stay in Cuba was extended by three weeks due
to "the steamer for Cadiz, once a month, departed on its voyage from Havana the day of
our arrival." 1 59 Mason and Slidell departed Havana on the 7th of November aboard a
British mail steamer, the Trent.
The Trent sparked an international crisis of monumental proportions. Captain
Charles Wilkes, commander of the U.S.S. San Jacinto, was the man who set off the crisis
on November 8, 1 86 1 off the coast of Spanish territorial waters in the Caribbean. 160
Wilkes' original orders from the Navy Department were to patrol off the coast of Africa
and capture Confederate privateer ships. He was only to come to the Caribbean to refuel
when needed. Wilkes soon caught wind of rumors that important members of the
Confederacy were awaiting transport in Cuba while he was in port. Captain Wilkes, while
resupplying in port, received new orders from the navy to return to the Philadelphia Navy
Yard, or he could pursue the possibility of these Confederates in Cuba headed for
England. He selected the latter option. 161 Wilkes wanted to humiliate the Confederacy
and bring glory and honor to both himself and his crew by capturing high level
Confederate officials.
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On the 8th of November Wilkes spotted the Trent and ordered warning shots to be
fired across the bow of the steamer. 1 62 The San Jacinto seized the Trent in international
waters without casualties, and the head Confederate diplomats John Slidell and James
Mason were indeed onboard the English ship that was headed for London. Wilkes took
the prisoners back to the United States where he was greeted with a hero's welcome. The
Union public was ecstatic to hear some good news about the war for once, and "the
greatest excitement manifested in this city [New York], as well as in Washington,
yesterday, upon the receipt of the news of the arrest of the rebel commissioners."163 They
were tired of hearing about the Union losses on the battlefield. 164 Mason and Slidell were
transported to Fort Warren in Boston. The New York Times predicted that '"the English
government will make no serious complaint of the seizure of Mason and Slidell. She may
possibly fasten upon some of the incidents of that capture as having been irregular, but
the leading principles of international law are too clearly in favor of the action of Capt.
Wilkes to leave room for any serious question." 165 The New York Times prediction was
seriously incorrect. The British government did not take kindly to one of their ships being
stopped and searched by an American vessel in international waters.
The initial British response was outrage. The British public and government were
furious that their neutrality had been broken by the search of the Trent. On November 30,
1 86 1 , the English government ordered the English fleet into readiness, gathered troops to
send to Canada, and began stockpiling supplies and munitions. 1 66 The British navy was
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also being put on high alert. Foreign Secretary Russell warned the Board of the
Admiralty that the growing hostilities between the United States and England "makes it
not unlikely that other sudden acts of aggression may be attempted." 167 Admiral
Alexander Milne was the commander of the North America and West Indies Station. He
commanded the English fleet between Canada and the Caribbean. He was the British
admiral on the front lines during the American Civil War. He navigated the blockade and
the question of what to do with Confederate shipping. He had close ties with the British
ambassador to the Union, Lord Richard Lyons. Admiral Milne was ordered by the Lord
Commissioners of the Admiralty to send his ships to strategic defensive locations due to
'"the existing state of affairs and to the possibility that actual hostilities may be
commenced against England by the U.S. Government or that a declaration of war with
the Govt. may be made by Great Britain." 168 War between England and the United States
loomed just over the horizon. Secretary H unter was confident England would "take the
proper steps to avenge the insult thus audaciously offered to their country by the United
States."1 69
As England geared up for war with the United States, Lincoln and William
Seward had a hard time controlling the American public after the capture of these very
prominent Confederate diplomats. It was hard for them to negotiate with the British with
the cheers and rejoicing of the public always in the background. Nevertheless, despite its
initial reaction of war, the British government decided war was not the proper course of

167

Russel l t o the Board o f the Admiralty, November 30, 1861, i n The Milne Papers 1860-1862 ( Farnham,
Su rrey, 2015), 516.
168
The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to Mil ne, December 6, 1861, in The Milne Papers 1860-1862
(Farnham, Surrey, 2015), 521.
169
H u nter to Yancey, Rost, and Mann, November 20, 1861, i n Official Records of the Union ancl
Confederate Navies, vol. I l l, I I (Washington : G. P.O., 1922), 297.

74

action. 1 70 England was not ready to defend Canada from a massive U.S. invasion and the
Royal government did not know how Washington was going to react to the crisis. The
transatlantic telegraph cable was established in 1 858. However, during the crisis, the wire
was broken; this allowed both England and the United States to cool off before rash
decisions were made. 1 7 1 This pause in communications also allowed public anger to die
down as excitement from the Trent Affair faded in time. Both nations wanted a peaceful
resolution to this crisis. Seward received an ultimatum from the British government
demanding an apology and the release of the diplomats. Seward responded with a note of
his own detailing that Wilkes acted without orders and the capture of the commissioners
was in international waters. The United States, in Seward' s mind, had every right to stop
that ship. 1 72 Since both sides feared a war in 1 86 1 and the public outcry over the Trent
incident was waning, Lincoln, on December 26th, 1 86 1 , released Slidell and Mason from
federal prison and allowed them to travel to Europe. 1 73 The release of the Confederate
prisoners was welcomed by all in Europe. The Trent Affair did not lead to war between
the U.K. and the U.S. However, it would put a strain on their relationship for quite some
time during the Civil War. Both Union and Confederates had the cloud of the Trent
Affair looming over their heads during negotiations.
During the Trent crisis and the entire American Civil War, William Seward led
the State Department and headed up the diplomatic mission for the United States.
William Seward was born on May 1 6, 1 80 1 in rural New York to Mary and Samuel
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Seward. 1 74 His family resided in a small village where the community was very close.
Seward' s father was an important member of the small community. Samuel Seward also
served in the New York legislature for a few years, but his passion was in local politics.
William saw and heard the debates at the table or out in the community. He grew up
around it and that exposure shaped his future career path. His father also shaped his
opinion on slavery at an early age. William became an outspoken critic of slavery later in
life and was quick to join the newly formed Republican Party. His antislavery views
began at home with his father. Seward's parents made sure that William and the: other
kids knew the equality of both the black and white races. 1 75 The Republican Party
provided a political opportunity to express that belief.
Seward left his small hometown village in 1 8 1 6 for Union College. He was the
only member of his family that attended college. 1 76 In school, Seward was driven,
focused, bright, but also like to have fun. His college years formed and honed his debate
skills that he used to propel himself later in his political career. Seward was in college
when the sectional crisis in the United Sates was in its infancy. The balance of free and
slave states was stable and the tension over slavery was starting to come to the forefront
of American politics. Seward graduated from college in 1 8 1 9 and went on to work in
small law offices around New York. 1 77 Law was only a stepping stone for Seward. He
moved to Auburn, New York and threw himself into politics.

In

Auburn, Seward crafted

his skills as a politician from getting involved, like his father, in local politics. He
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advocated for popular elections and a people's party. 1 78 His early days of politics
reflected his love and admiration for democracy and the democratic process. His push for
popular elections and an early form Jacksonian Democracy in a small-town setting
prepared him for his next ambition, state politics.
Seward was elected to the New York legislature in 1 830. He brought his youth,
debate skills, and vigor with him to Albany. His first major speech in the legislature was
on the Second Bank of the United States. In 1 832, President Andrew Jackson famously
vetoed a bill to extend the bank's charter. Seward came out in favor of the bank and
attacked the Democrats for their blind loyalty to the president. 1 79 Seward made his voice
heard in the legislature. This was a very contentious and divisive time in America. The
bank veto and Jackson were central issues of the day and the newly elected Seward
attacked them both head on almost as soon as he arrived in the legislature in Albany.
While in the legislature, Seward was also a member of New York's highest court, the
Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors. New York, like most
states at the time had two different legal tracks: one for actions at law and one for actions
in equity. 1 80 While serving on this court as a check to the judges in the lower courts,
Seward heard many cases on a wide array of topics, land disputes, contracts, and issues of
racial equality. It exposed him to the wider selection of problems facing America at the
time. It took Seward from a state politician to a national one. His experience in the New
York legislature prepared him for a changing America. One that became ever more
divisive and divided along sectional lines.
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Over the next few years, Seward continued to bounce between politics and law.
Notably, in 1 839, Seward was elected governor ofNew York until 1 842. He was elected
as Whig and served his state well. However, after his term was up, Seward opted to leave
politics to settle debts and be with his family in Aubum.18 1 However, Seward could not
be pulled away from politics for that long because in 1 849, he was elected to the U.S.
Senate to represent New York. Seward was already a political legend in New York. Now
he made his mark on Washington. During his time in the Senate, Seward was his bold
and outspoken self. He protested the South's attempt to secure more power and disrupt
the delicate balance of power in America between slave and free states. His stance on
slavery was still rooted in his parent' s teachings on equality. He had seen the im�quality
in America from his days as a lawyer and serving in New York. Once in Washington,
Seward was presented with a nation on the brink of a disaster. When he entered the
Senate, a major sectional crisis was underway. The Mexican American War hadl opened
the West for America. The debate after the war regarded the newly acquired territory and
slavery's expansion into that new territory. The compromise that would, for the next
decade, quell the sectional issue was being introduced into Congress when Seward
arrived, the Compromise of 1 850. It was a set of bills that hoped to put an end to the
sectional divide in America over the issue of slavery. Seward wholeheartedly argued
against the expansion of slavery into the West. The Compromise of 1 850 passed and was
put into effect. However, Seward was an outspoken critic of the pro-slavery measures put
into the compromise. He famously declared that there was a "higher power than the
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Constitution" to remove slavery from America. 1 82 This speech put Seward in the spotlight
during the antebellum years and at the forefront of the antislavery movement. The
staunch antislavery rhetoric of Seward and the rise of a new political party, the
Republican Party, showed how deeply the sectional divide had become in political life in
America. The Republican Party was as close to an abolition party in the late 1 850s as a
party could get. Seward was drawn to the new party and joined in 1 85 5 . 1 8 3
Seward's political career early in his life had prepared him for his work later in
life. Seward was used to getting his was and fighting with his political opponents. The
Republican Convention in 1 860, held in Chicago, was Seward's chance to attain the
ultimate position of power, the presidency. Going into the convention, Seward was the
popular favorite. He was well known in Washington and beloved by his constituents back
in New York. However, an up-and-coming single term congressman from Illinois
challenged Seward for the nomination; that man was Abraham Lincoln. Seward and his
team failed to recognize the threat that Lincoln posed. For over thirty years, Seward drew
lines in the sand, made political enemies, and made controversial political stances.
Lincoln had only served one term in Congress during the Mexican American War and
opposed President Polk's war and the expansion of slavery. This was not a controversial
move, and Lincoln was far from the only person who questioned the president. Lincoln
came into the convention with Midwest and New England support. Seward was an
advocate for immigrant rights and the nativists in Pennsylvania and New England
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resented Seward for it. 1 84 Their votes went to Lincoln. It was a crushing defeat for
Seward.
After the convention in Chicago, Seward thought his political career was over. He
had faith that Lincoln would win the election. However, he expected to be the president
in 1 860, not Lincoln. Despite their differences, after Lincoln's win, Seward was asked to
be the secretary of state in the Lincoln administration. Seward, fearing exile to small
town Auburn, accepted Lincoln' s offer on December 28, 1 860. 1 85 After Lincoln 's
election many of the Southern states seceded from the Union, starting with South
Carolina. Seward, being a staunch unionist, tried to save the Union before the nation
devolved into a civil war. His efforts to persuade Lincoln to negotiate failed. The Lincoln
administration took a policy of non-negotiation with the states in open rebellion with the
government. Seward did not want bloodshed. However, as more states left the Union
after Lincoln's call for troops to put down the rebellion, Seward gave up his peaceable
position and turned into a hawk.
This aggressive posture carried over during his time as secretary of state:. He was
determined to prevent the European powers, especially England, from recognizing the
Confederacy as an independent nation. His tactics were aggressive, brash, threatening,
and a bit desperate at times. However, his diplomats on the ground were much more
aware of the delicate situation the Union was in during the Civil War. The top diplomat
for the Union during the Civil War was Charles Francis Adams. He was the son of
President John Quincey Adams and the grandson of President John Adams. He was born
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on August 1 8, 1 807 in Boston. 1 86 Charles Adams grew up in an ambassador family.
Before becoming president, his father served as the United States Minister to Russia from
1 809- 1 8 1 4 and England from 1 8 1 5- 1 8 1 7 and his grandfather served as the Minister to
England from 1 785- 1 788. 1 87 The family had deep roots in both government and
diplomacy. Charles Adams went to Harvard College where he finished his first term fiftyfirst in a class of fifty-nine. 1 88 His father pushed him hard and expected more from his
son. John Quincy was worried about his son in school, but the family reputation and the
public spotlight made John Quincy demand more from Charles. At Harvard, Charles
Adams applied himself only to the classes he derived personal benefit from and as a
result, Adams graduated Harvard in 1 825 in the middle of his class. 1 89 After graduation,
Adams practiced law in and around Boston. He stuck around his family until he was able
to financially support himself after his marriage to Abigail Brooks. His father slowly
pushed him into politics and away from practicing law. New England in the 1 830s was
transforming. The founding of the Liberator in 1 83 1 and the murder of Elijah P. Lovejoy
in 1 83 7 had a profound impact on Adams. 1 90 He was by no means an abolitionist nor on
the proslavery side. The slavery debate got Adams involved in politics and with the Whig
Party.
In 1 838, Adams was offered a Whig nomination for the state legislature. He
refused because he felt he could best serve the community by remaining politically
neutral and that allowed Adams to say what he wanted when we wanted to say it. 19 1
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However, the next few years saw the Whigs lose power to the Democrats and the New
England fear of Southern power in government gripped Boston and Adams.

In

1 840, he

was asked again to be a Whig candidate for the state House of Representatives.192 This
time, Adams accepted and won easily. He went on to get reelected three times and serve
in the Massachusetts Senate from 1 843 to 1 845. During his time in state politics, the
influence of the antislavery and the early brewing of an abolition movement influenced
Adams. He became more vocal on slavery and took a stand on the issue. Adams also
spoke out against the admission of Texas into the Union and spoke out against the war
with Mexico. Because Adams spoke out against the expansion of slavery and the
Mexican-American War, he joined the Conscience Whigs. They were a branch of the
Whig Party based in Massachusetts who opposed the annexation of Texas and feared the
expansion of slavery to the West endangered the stability of the republic. During the
convention to select candidates for the 1 848 presidential election, Adams was elected as
the vice-presidential candidate on the Free Soil Party ticket with former president Martin
Van Buren. 1 93 Although not successful, Adams secured his position in antislavery
politics. With the rise of the Republican Party in the 1 850s, Adams supported Fremont
for the Republican nomination. Fremont failed to win the presidency. However, Adams
was inspired by his poll numbers and in 1 858, Adams accepted a nomination to the U.S.
House of Representatives where he served until the outbreak of the Civil War. 1 94
Charles Francis Adams was given his letter of instructions on April 1 0, 1 86 1 .
Seward told Adams to head to England where his task "involves the responsibility of
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preventing the commission of an act by the government of that country [Confederate
States of America] which would be fraught with disaster, perhaps ruin, of our own."195
England was the main target of Confederate diplomacy. However, their goals and plans
were not clear to Seward. Davis was quick to establish a government but was "slow in
revealing its permanent character. Only outlines of a policy can be drawn."196 Adams
headed to England almost blind on the Confederate diplomatic goals, aside from the
obvious goal of recognition. Adams arrived in England on May 1 3, 1 86 1 . Once he
arrived he went straight to work. The British government met with Adams in an official
capacity, unlike with the Confederate delegation. Although Adams was met with cheers
and joy after his arrival, he confided in a letter to Seward that he "cannot say that the
public opinion is yet exactly what we would wish it. Much depends upon the course of
things in the United States, and the firmness and energy made visible in the direction of
affairs." 1 97 The opening stages of the American Civil War were filled with uncertainty
and tension, on both sides of the Atlantic. The British Parliament and British public had
choices to make and opinions to form about the Confederate States of America. The
chambers of Parliament and newspapers were filled with debates and arguments over the
Confederate question. Both Adams and Mason, who arrived in England on January 29,
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1 862 after his release from Fort Warren, relied on these debates to relay possible
diplomatic actions back to their respective governments.
The American Civil War was brought up in the House of Lords on April 29, 1 86 1 ,
shortly after the first shots of the war were fired at Fort Sumter. The question centered
around Lord Lyons, British ambassador to the United States during the Civil War. Lord
Wodehouse, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, told the
members that the Government "came to the conclusion that it was not desirable that this
country should intrude her officers or counsel on the Government of the United States.
However great the interest which we may feel in the welfare of her people, and however
anxious we might be to rescue them from the misfortune which appears to be impending
over their heads, we yet thought that a great and independent nation might not welcome
advice given with respect to her internal affairs, if that advice were proffered without
being solicited."1 98 At the outbreak of the war, England did not want to interject her own
opinion or mediation for fear of retaliation from the United States. England wished for a
speedy resolution to the war, but the British government did not want to place itself in the
United States' domestic problems. The major diplomatic and legal dilemma during the
opening stages of the war was the Union blockade of the Confederate ports.
When war erupted between the Union and the Confederacy the nations of the
world had a choice to make regarding the Confederate States. Were they, as the Union
characterized them, rebels who were in opposition to the federal government? Or, was the
Confederate States of America an independent nation fighting for its right to exist in the
world? Before the war, England and the United States were closely tied together by the
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Atlantic trade. Relations had healed since the War of 1 8 1 2 and the Napoleonic Wars.
Trade was profitable for both nations. However, the war threatened that trade. The.
British government, fearful of their shipping rights to both nations, took the middle
option at the outbreak of the conflict and, on May 6, 1 86 1 , "the Attorney and Solicitor
General, and the Queen's Advocate and the Government have come to the opinion that
the Southern Confederacy of America . . . must be treated as a belligerent."199 Giving the
Confederacy belligerent status gave them some rights under international law and was a
step from formal recognition. The proclamation of neutrality and belligerent status
infuriated Seward. The proclamation left the United States "no alternative but to regard
the government of Great Britain as questioning our free exercise of all the rights of selfdefense guaranteed to us by our Constitution and the laws of nature and of nations to
suppress the insurrection."200 In the view of the Union, since the war was waged to put
down a rebellion, England, and the larger European community of nations, had no right
to interfere with the affairs happening within the boundaries of the United States. And
since the Union fought an insurrection rather than a foreign nation, the government of the
United States issued a blockade of the Southern ports to halt the import and export of
goods and weapons that aided the Confederacy. This was part of a larger plan, the
Anaconda Plan, to strangle and starve the Confederate States into submission. The
blockade had a massive ripple effect across the Atlantic world.
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Seward and Adams knew the British government would not be happy about the
blockade. The blockade was necessary for restoring order to the Union and the North had
"a right to close the ports which have been seized by insurrectionists, for the purpose of
suppressing the attempted revolution, and no one could justly complain if we had done so
decisively and peremptorily." 201 Seward also expressed the Union' s strong desire to
"avoid imposing hardships unnecessarily onerous upon foreign as well as domestic
commerce."202 The Union blockade, even though it eliminated the Southern ports from
the global market, did not, according to Seward, have any intention of disturbing foreign
trade. The British government, as well as any other foreign government, did not have any
right to complain about the blockade because "the President' s proclamation was a notice
of the intention to blockade, and it was provided that ample warning should be given to
vessels approaching and vessels seeking to leave the blockaded ports before capture
should be allowed."203 Despite the ample warning, according to Seward, the British
government was divided over the issue of the blockade. Admiral Milne summed up the
concerns of the British government by raising questions that took the entire war to
resolve in some cases in a letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty where he asked if the
United States and the Confederates were
considered in a state of actual war? And if so, how far does the Paris Declaration
of 1 856, in respect to free Ships making free goods, if not contraband of war, and
neutral goods, not contraband, not being seizable in Enemies' Ships, to be
considered applicable to British Ships conveying goods, the property of either
Belligerent, or their Ships conveying British goods? Are the Belligerents to be
allowed to visit and search our merchant Ships on the High Seas? Contraband of
201
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War will probably be defined by each of the Belligerents? The validity of a
Blockade held to be dependent on its efficiency?204
The British government did recognize both sides as belligerent nations. However, exactly
how far the rights entitled to belligerent nations extended was another question because
the British government was forced to determine exactly how effective the Union
blockade of the South was in order to figure out its legality.
The Declaration of Paris in 1 856 was the leading international maritime law at the
time. It was drafted after the Crimean War. This document was the document the
Europeans, Northerners, and Southerners used to justify their naval actions during the
American Civil War. The Civil War was the first major conflict where the Declaration of
Paris came into play. The treaty "( I ) abolished privateering, (2) the neutral flag covers
enemy goods with the exception of contraband of war, (3 ) Neutral goods, with the
exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an enemy flag, and ( 4)
Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force
sufficient to prevent access to the coasts of an enemy."205 The treaty was revolutionary in
naval combat because of the removal of privateering and the rules regarding a blockade.
Those two issues were central to the debate in England and North America during the
war. The United States did not sign on to the Declaration of Paris. They did not want to
be involved with European law, and during warfare, the United States relied heavily on
the use of privateers due to the small size of its navy. However, in an attempt to appease
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England, the U.S. declared that it would respect the articles of the declaration but did not
sign the document.
Jefferson Davis and the Confederate government refused to sign on to the
Declaration of Paris nor did they agree to respect the treaty. In fact, Davis went a step
further and directly opposed the declaration by issuing a proclamation calling for
privateers and issuing letters of marque on the 1 7th of April. President Davis invited "all
those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this
government in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make application for
commissions or letters of marque and reprisal, to be issued under the seal of these
Confederate States. "206 The Confederates had no navy to speak of at the opening of the
war and needed privateering to break the blockade and attempt to secure its ports and
shores. The Union stranglehold on Southern ports only grew with time. The vastly
superior Union navy, although stretched thin, managed to put up a more or less effective
blockade of the Confederate States by spring 1 862. This was important because of article
four of the Paris Declaration-blockades must be effective for them to be binding.
Seward assured the British government that "the blockade from the time it takes effect is
everywhere rendered actual and effective." 207 Lord Russell noticed the Union' s effort to
maintain an effective blockade and mentioned before the House of Lords that the
blockade was
a matter of the greatest importance to them-it was a vital point of their policy;
therefore we cannot doubt that they used every means in their power. We find that
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as early as the 1 5th of July, when complaints were made in some of the New York
papers that the blockading squadron was not sufficient, that the Government had
then sent on that service 34 men-of-war, of 56,000 tons, with 726 guns, and
1 0, 1 1 3 men. This showed that the Federal Government made great efforts to
render the blockade efficient. 208
By early 1 862, it was clear the English were not going to interfere with the Union
blockade. This was made clear to Mason who sat in on the House of Lords to listen to the
debate on the 1 0th of March 1 862 and told the Confederate State Department that "on the
question of the blockade . . . no step will be taken by this Government [England] to
interfere with it."209 The decreasing supply of cotton along with Mason's inability to
convince the British government of the ineffectiveness of the blockade sunk the
Confederate hopes of English intervention to break up the blockade. A few weeks later,
Slidell had equally bad news from Paris. Slidell regretfully told Secretary Hunter that
France has '"proclaimed the full adhesion of the Emperor to Earl Russell's views of the
efficiency of the Federal blockade of our coast."2 1 0 In a matter of weeks, the hopes of
European intervention to break the blockade and save the strangled Confederacy were
gone. The English and the French both declared, together, that the blockade was effective
and the Declaration of Paris, which the United States agreed to adhere to but not sign,
was not violated. The Southern commissioners were outplayed by their Union
counterparts and were prevented from swaying the opinion of the European courts.
James Mason failed to secure any diplomatic assistance from England. The
Confederacy needed the British navy to break the blockade and supply their armies with
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munitions and food. Mason never received an official meeting with Lord Russell, and the
British government was hesitant to even meet with Mason unofficially in fear of creating
tension with the United States. Charles Adams was a born diplomat. His family was full
of diplomats and successful individuals. His government provided Adams with support
and results, both diplomatically and militarily, that the Confederate government could not
give to Mason. With England' s support out of the picture, the Confederates were out of
feasible options for foreign support. The most powerful nation in Europe and the globe
refused to recognize the Confederate States of America. That sent a message to the other
nations of Europe-follow in the footsteps of England.
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Conclusion

By all accounts, the Confederate States of America was a failure. The radical
experiment to break away from the Union and the assertion of states' rights over the
power of the federal government designed by the planter elite and fought for by the poor
whites of the South died on May 9, 1 865 at Appomattox Courthouse after the Army of
Northern Virginia surrendered. The four long, bloody years of turmoil was over. The
Confederates not only failed in their attempt to break away, they also failed in their
attempts to gain European support for their cause and their independence. By the summer
of 1 863, the Union held the military advantage on the battlefield. With their massive
manpower advantage coupled with their manufacturing capacity, the Union armies saw
success after success. The military successes were not an anomaly, nor were they
independent of the diplomatic successes achieved by the Union State Department. The
victories on the battlefields in America gave extra leverage at the diplomatic table for the
Union. The adverse was true for the Confederate commissioners as well. Although the
battlefield was a factor in the overall failure of the Confederacy, the real failure started
and ended with the commissioners themselves.
Diplomacy is a very strategic dance played one-on-one in person, even in today' s
modem, digital world of social media and the internet. The importance of the interactions
and the meetings with heads of state or foreign relations officials were vital to the
diplomacy in the 1 9th century. Meetings face to face with a foreign minister allowed
direct communication of ideas, demands, offers, or pleas. The Confederates failed to
secure official meetings with European leaders or ministers during the war. The major
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nations of England and France saw the Confederate diplomats right from the start in an
unofficial capacity since they were not a recognized nation. These meetings proved an
enormous opportunity to Davis and his government for securing future meetings or
recognition and intervention. However, the Southern diplomatic commissioners failed to
do their job effectively and thus they failed to secure future one-on-one meetings. Mason,
who headed the most important delegation for the Confederate cause in all of Europe, in
particular, failed to convince Lord Russell or Her Majesty's government to support the
Confederate cause in their first meeting. Mason was not effective at selling the right for
the Confederate States of America to exist among the family of nations. This initial
failure, coupled with the resignation of Yancey shortly after his arrival to England, set the
Confederacy up for failure in England.
The Confederate State Department provided little help to their commissioners
who they sent abroad. The initial instructions for their diplomats from the secretaries of
state were fairly clear, but the lofty moral and legal reasons the Confederates cited to
justify their independence was not conveyed in any meaningful or convincing way. The
diplomats relied on their own abilities without much follow up direction from a
Confederate State Department in constant turnover. The revolving door at the secretary of
state' s office was a major problem for the Confederacy. There was no single leader who
took the reins on foreign policy for the Confederate States of America. That proved to be
one of the major setbacks faced by the Confederacy and not by the Union. The changing
secretaries of state during the war also exemplified the lack of care coming from that
office. Both Toombs and Hunter resigned the post because they found it to be boring and
without glory. For the American Southerner, glory and honor was everything. War was
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glorified, and a system of old European style honor and gentlemanliness existed. Sitting
behind a desk writing letters did not fit in that model of war constructed by the
Confederacy. The lack of care and the lack of desire to be in the State Department
challenged the Confederate diplomats unnecessarily.
Although official Confederate government diplomatic efforts were utter failures,
the agents who the government sent to negotiate weapons deals, loans, trade deals, or
manufacturing contracts were far more successful. These efforts were not included this
thesis because they did not represent, nor were they part of, the official Confederate
diplomatic agenda. These agents often conducted business with businesses or companies
who worked behind the back of their government or against the laws of their country.
Although these actions are not elaborated here in this thesis, they are worth noting since
they did happen and suggest the Confederates did not fail every time in foreign
negotiating. The most famous example of this success is the building of the A labama by
the British shipbuilding company John Laird Sons and Company in 1 862. Since England
declared neutrality in the American Civil War, they could not legally supply either side
with arms or munitions. James Bulloch, who served in the United States navy before the
war, was a secret agent assigned to England who oversaw Confederate naval operations
and unofficial trade with England. He was very skilled at what he did, and his skills
secured numerous trade deals. However, his biggest accomplishment was the commission
of the CSS A labama. Bulloch managed to establish enough support in Liverpool to
arrange for John Laird Sons and Company to build and equip the ship for the
Confederacy. The building of the ship broke both English and international law.
Bulloch's success with the A labama and financing the Confederacy with illegal cotton
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shipments from the Confederacy to England illustrates the Confederate States of America
had some limited success in Europe.
Despite the success of Bulloch and others, the main, official Southern diplomatic
corps failed in Europe. The official treaties signed and ratified with the Native American
tribes are just about the only formal success the Confederacy had in international
relations. The story of the Civil War is not just an American one. The conflict spanned
the Atlantic Ocean and was at the center of debate in European courts across the
continent. It is important that these stories are told and are carried down. The success of
either side of the conflict rested heavily on the shoulders of these diplomats in Europe.
The future of a nation was partly in their hands. This mysterious and unknown side of the
war needs to be brought into the light and out of the shadows. Diplomacy and
international affairs are not limited to just the 20th and 2 1 st centuries. For us as a nation, it
is vital that our story, our entire story is told. Although not as exciting or glorious as
military battles, the diplomatic struggle was just as important.

In the

case of the American

Civil War, diplomacy changed the course of a nation and killed another. Diplomacy is a
powerful weapon that can change the course of history, and in the 1 860s, diplomacy did
exactly that.
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